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ABSTRACT 
The coast of Louisiana, with more than three million wetland acres, accounts for about 
40 percent of the nation‟s total wetlands. Louisiana is estimated to have lost more than 1.2 
million acres of its coastal wetland in the last century. Although 75% of Louisiana‟s coastal 
wetlands are privately owned, little has been done to encourage private landowners to 
undertake wetland restoration projects. This dissertation examines the factors that influence 
the decisions of the landowners to undertake wetland restoration projects. We develop a 
theoretical framework for understanding the landowner‟s decision-making process in the 
presence of high uncertainty and increasing restoration costs. The condition under which 
landowners will invest in wetland restoration and maintenance is derived under the 
assumptions of risk aversion and relatively high restoration costs. The validity of the 
theoretical model is tested using data from a mail survey of private wetland landowners in 
coastal Louisiana that was conducted in Fall of 2009. Two econometric (Tobit and double 
hurdle) models are estimated to determine the importance of various factors including risk 
aversion on the probability and the level of private coastal wetland investments.  
The Likelihood ratio (LR) test shows that the double hurdle model statistically 
outperforms the Tobit model. The results suggest that the decision to invest in wetland 
restoration and how much to invest appear to be determined by different processes.  The 
results of the double hurdle model show that risk plays an important role in landowners‟ 
decisions to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance activities. Landowners who are 
risk averse make less investment in wetland restoration and maintenance projects than other 
landowners, and landowners who own properties that are located in risk prone areas are less 
likely to invest in wetland restoration than other landowners. In addition, the results show that 
x 
 
landowners‟ attitudes toward conservation, income related to the property, participation in 
government wetland programs, ownership structure, and wetland property size are all 
important determinants of the landowners‟ investment decisions. The analysis emphasizes the 
need to incorporate risk into the design of wetland incentive programs to encourage private 
landowners to undertake wetland restoration projects in coastal Louisiana.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The coast of Louisiana, with more than three million wetland acres, accounts for about 
40 percent of the nation‟s coastal wetlands (Lipton et al., 1995). In the last century, however, 
Louisiana is estimated to have lost more than 1.2 million acres (1,875 square miles) of its 
coastal wetlands (CWPPRA 2006). A number of factors have contributed to this loss. Topping 
the list is the construction of flood-control levees along the Mississippi River (Boesch et al. 
1994) which prevent wetlands from receiving adequate fresh water and nutrients that are 
necessary to their survival. In addition, the dredging of access canals and navigation channels 
led to the redirection of alluvial sediments away from the coast which has exacerbated erosion 
and saltwater intrusion. As a result, it is estimated that about 160-200 million metric tons per 
year of sediments that once supplied the coastal wetlands are now delivered directly onto the 
outer continental shelf (Caffey and Shexnayder 2003; Caffey, 2005). Besides these human-
induced factors, wetland losses are also caused by natural factors such as hurricanes, sea level 
rise, land subsidence, and nutria herbivory activities. For example, the U.S. Geological 
Survey estimates that 219 square miles of Louisiana coastal wetlands were destroyed as a 
result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Barras et al., 2008). According to some estimates, the 
economic cost of projected wetland loss from all sources by 2050 under a “no action” 
scenario is in the range of $27-$100 billion (LADNR 1999).  
In an effort to address the problem of Louisiana‟s coastal land loss, the U.S. Congress 
passed the Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration Act (CWPPRA) in 1990. 
But, given the estimated price tag for coastal restoration of $20 billion (Galloway et al., 
2009), only a fraction of the needed funds have been allocated, with CWPPRA, the largest 
program, accounting for only $60 million annually.  Several other public restoration projects 
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in the coastal zone of Louisiana have been funded by programs such as the Coastal Impact 
Assistance Program (CIAP), the Louisiana Coastal Area (LCA) program, the Coastal Wetland 
Reserve Program (CWRP), the Chrismas Tree Projects Program, and  the Vegetation Planting 
Program initiated under the Louisiana‟s Coastal Wetlands Conservation Plan. CWRP, 
introduced to restore coastal wetlands on areas previously converted to agriculture, has 
succeeded in restoring hundreds of acres of coastal wetlands (CPRA, 2007).  However, the 
limited availability of public funding, along with the magnitude of the problem, increases the 
importance of finding alternative approaches to addressing the issue of wetland loss in coastal 
Louisiana. Given that the vast majority of wetland properties are privately owned, incentive-
based mechanisms to encourage private actions may be an appealing alternative approach.  
 
Encouraging landowners to undertake private restoration and maintenance activities 
can be a difficult task for several reasons. First, the decision to invest in wetland restoration 
and maintenance is subject to a high level of uncertainty associated with future climate 
change, changes in restoration technologies, and changes in wetland regulatory policy. 
Second, the majority of benefits associated with wetland restoration and maintenance 
activities accrue to the public rather than to private landowners. Other reasons that may 
prevent private investment include diminishing surface and sub-surface incomes, increasing 
regulatory constraints, and a current property tax policy that fails to account for the use value 
for the wetland property (Caffey et al., 2003). 
1.1 Problem Statement  
Louisiana is projected to lose an additional 431,000 acres (673 square miles) of its 
coastal wetlands by the year 2050 if the current wetland loss rates continue (CWPPRA 2006). 
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The economic implications of this projected loss are often debated, but there are billions of 
dollars that are directly or indirectly derived from activities occurring on these wetlands. 
Although 75% of these wetlands are privately owned Caffey et al., 2003), little is known 
about how much private investment has been allocated to restoration and maintenance, nor is 
there a good understanding of what can be done to encourage private landowners to maintain 
and protect their coastal lands. This dissertation seeks to fill this information void by 
estimating the amount of private investment (at least for a subset of landowners) and 
investigating the factors that influence private Louisiana landowners to invest in coastal 
wetland restoration and maintenance activities, with particular emphasis on the influence of 
risk aversion and public subsidy programs on the private investment decision. More 
specifically, the following questions are addressed in this dissertation: First, what are the 
factors that motivate a landowner to undertake wetland restoration and maintenance 
activities? Second, what are the factors that deter a landowner from investing in wetland 
restoration and maintenance activities? Third, how does uncertainty influence a landowner‟s 
decision making process? And finally, how do potential government subsidy programs 
influence the landowner‟s investment decision?  
1.2. Justification 
Given that 75% of the wetland acreage in Louisiana‟s coastal zone is privately owned, 
successful coastal wetland restoration efforts will at least partly depend on the decisions of the 
private landowners who hold the ownership rights.  Little or no effort, however, has been 
employed to encourage private wetland landowners to undertake wetland restoration projects 
in coastal Louisiana. The majority of wetland restoration projects in the coastal zone are still 
addressed through public programs such as the Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and 
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Restoration Act (CWPPRA). These public programs, which generally fail to engage the 
landowners in the restoration process lack the monetary resources to adequately address all of 
the wetland loss problems in the coastal zone. Even if additional government funding was to 
be secured, the cost effectiveness of these public restoration projects by CWPPRA and other 
public programs remains an issue of debate. At the same time, several factors have been 
proposed as reasons for the lack of private investment by landowners, including increasing 
investment risk, diminishing surface and sub-surface incomes, increasing regulatory 
constraints, and the public nature of the majority of the benefits of private restoration projects. 
Given these problems, there has been a call for the use of incentive based voluntary programs 
to encourage the landowners to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance activities.  
In this dissertation, I investigate the factors that influence the landowners to undertake 
wetland restoration projects in coastal Louisiana. Understanding these factors is important for 
the design and implementation of voluntary programs to encourage private investment. For 
example, an estimated empirical model of landowner investment decision making can be used 
to provide information about the expected probability of participation, the expected level of 
investment, and the characteristics of the landowners who are most likely to participate. This 
information can provide the policy decision makers with the information needed to design 
wetland incentive programs that are both more cost effective and have higher participation 
rates than nontargeted wetland incentive programs. In addition, the information provided by 
an empirical model may allow policy makers to design incentive programs targeting 
restoration projects in areas that are most affected by wetland losses. This information is 
important when policy makers have to prioritize among competing wetland restoration 
projects given limited funding resources.  
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1.3 Objectives 
The overall objective of this dissertation is to investigate the factors that influence 
landowners‟ decisions to invest in coastal wetland restoration and maintenance when these 
decisions are made in the presence of uncertainty and fixed costs. Specific objectives inc lude: 
1. Develop a theoretical model of the landowners‟ decision-making process in the face of 
uncertainty and fixed costs;  
2. Determine the characteristics of wetland landowners in coastal Louisiana, including 
their risk preferences, attitudes toward private restoration and maintenance, the actual 
use of their properties, attitudes toward various government incentive programs, and 
their general socioeconomic profile; 
3. Empirically estimate the importance of risk aversion, public subsidy programs, and 
other factors affecting landowner decisions to invest in coastal wetland restoration and 
maintenance projects; and 
4. Examine the policy implications of the study results and devise policy 
recommendations that address the desirability and potential magnitude of private 
landowner investment in restoring and maintaining coastal Louisiana wetlands.  
 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 examines the 
economic and investment literature that relates to restoration-type decision making, including 
the potential roles of general factors, risk aversion, and option values.  Chapter 3 takes this 
literature base and develops a theoretical model of the private wetland restoration decision 
making process and draws some tentative implications from the model structure. Chapter 4 
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presents the empirical model. Chapter 5 then presents the design of the survey questionnaire 
used to collect data and summarizes the information reported by respondents.. Chapter 6 
presents the results of the model estimation, with Chapter 7 summarizing the main findings 
and discussing the potential policy implications.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Although there have been a number of studies that have identified factors that are 
important to private landowners‟ investment decisions concerning other activities, private 
investment in coastal wetland restoration and maintenance has not been seriously studied to 
date. A review of these studies is presented in this chapter, beginning with a set of studies that 
looked at factors that influence investment decisions under the assumption of risk neutrality.  
The second section presents the results of empirical studies concerning the effect of risk 
aversion on investment decisions, while the third section examines the results of empirical 
studies on the role of option values in investment decisions.   
2.1  General Factors Affecting Investment Decisions 
Even though there are no studies that  specifically examined those factors  influencing 
decisions to privately invest in wetland restoration and maintenance in coastal Louisiana, 
there are a number that  have identified general factors that may be important to wetland 
conservation efforts in the U.S. and other countries, including the factors influencing 
participation in publicly- financed wetland restoration programs.  Jones et al. (1995) surveyed 
private landowners in New Zealand to determine their attitudes toward wetland protection and 
potential conservation mechanisms. The survey results showed that the majority of private 
landowners placed importance on the role of wetlands in maintaining water quality and 
providing species habitat.  With regard to landowner preferences toward various conservation 
instruments, the survey revealed that incentive and voluntary instruments were most 
preferred.  One of the authors‟ conclusion from this result was that conservation programs 
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should use a range of land-use planning mechanisms, including ones based on economic 
incentives and financial compensation. Simple correlation tests showed that property size and 
the proportion of income derived from the property were significantly related to the 
landowners‟ attitudes about the importance and appropriate use of wetland areas. In addition, 
landowners who were engaged in farming activities were found to have negative attitudes 
toward the protection of wetlands.  
 Parks and Kramer (1995) investigated farmer participation in wetland restoration 
programs in the United States.  Results from logit analysis showed that increases in 
agricultural benefits decreased the probability of participation in wetland restoration. Farmer 
knowledge of government programs and their potential benefits, as measured by government 
payments received per acre, were also found to significantly (at the 10% level) increase the 
probability of participating. Age and ownership structure were important factors in the 
participation decision as well, with older farmers and owner operators being more likely to 
become involved in wetland restoration programs. The authors also examined the probability 
of participation by county and used this information to calculate the expected acreage restored 
and the expected government costs for the restoration.   
From an international perspective, Soderqvist (2003) used a random sample of 200 
Swedish farmers to determine the factors that influence their willingness to participate in a 
catchment-based program for wetland creation in Sweden. The results of a probit analysis 
showed that factors such as age, attitudes of farmers, and perceived advantages and 
disadvantages of the program were important determinants of participation decisions. The 
study concluded that financial factors (i.e., subsidies) were not the sole determinant of a 
farmer ‟s willingness to participate in the program, as various private and public 
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environmental benefits of the program were also significantly related to participation 
decisions. 
Aside from the above studies that focused on wetlands, other studies have examined private 
landowner investment decisions concerning other activities. For example, Ervin and Ervin 
(1982) examined the factors that determine the use of soil conservation practices using a 
random sample of Missouri farmers.  The study found that education, perception of the degree 
of erosion problem, the susceptibility of soil to erosion, and cost sharing subsidies were 
positively correlated with the farmers‟ soil conservation efforts.  However, when the number 
of soil practices was used as a dependent variable, only education, perception of the degree of 
erosion problem, farm type, and risk aversion were statistically significant in their model. The 
number of practices used was negatively related to the risk aversion of the farmers, and 
positively related to education and the perception of erosion problem. Similarly, Norris and 
Batie (1987) used a Tobit model to investigate the soil conservation decisions among Virginia 
farmers. Using total conservation expenditures as a dependent variable, the study found that 
financial factors - such as income and debt level - are the most important determinants of a 
farmer ‟s investment decision. Income had a positive influence on the level of conservation 
expenditures, and debt level had a negative influence on the level of conservation 
expenditures. Other factors, such as perception of erosion, farm size, education, off- farm 
employment, tenure arrangement, tobacco acreage, and the existence of conservation plan 
were also important factors in the decision to invest. More specifically, farm size and 
education were positively related to the level of conservation investment while tenure 
arrangement was negatively related to the level of conservation investment.    
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Featherstone and Goodwin (1993) analyzed the factors that influenced Kansas farmers 
to invest in long-term conservation improvements. Employing a Tobit analysis, the authors 
showed that farm characteristics - such as farm size, debt, erosion level, type of farm, and 
participation in government programs - were important explanatory factors. In particular, the 
larger the farm size is and the larger the government payments, the higher the likelihood of 
participation and the higher the level of investment that would be made. The authors also 
found that operator and farm characteristics, such as age and ownership type, had significant 
influences on conservation expenditures. More specifically, the older the farm operator is, the 
less likely an expenditure would be made and, if made, the smaller the investment that would 
be undertaken.  At least in Kansas, farms organized as corporations made larger investments 
than sole-owner farms. Unlike Norris and Batie (1987), income was not found to significantly 
influence overall conservation expenditures.  In another study examining the role of 
ownership, Soule et al. (2000) used a logit model to estimate the influence of land tenure on 
the adoption of conservation practices by U.S. corn producers. The authors extended previous 
analyses by distinguishing renters based on lease type and by distinguishing conservation 
practices based on the timing of costs and returns. The results of their long-run conservation 
tillage model revealed that adoption was significantly and positively associated with farm 
size, education, the proportion of the farm in corn and soybeans, and the susceptibility of the 
land to erosion, and negatively related to age. Tenure and participation in government 
programs were not significant factors in the conservation tillage model. The authors‟ medium-
term practices model showed similar results to the conservation tillage model, with the 
exception that the coefficient on tenure was negative and statistically significant.  Overall, 
study results suggested that cash-renters were less likely to adopt conservation tillage than 
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owner-operators, and share renters were less likely than owner-operator to adopt medium-
term practices.  In an international context, Layva et al. (2007) analyzed the adoption of soil 
conservation practices among 223 olive tree farmers in Spain. Three probit models were 
estimated for the three different conservation practices (tillage, terraces with stonewalls, and 
non-tillage practices). The study found that farm profitability, age of the farm operator, and 
the probability of passing on the farm to a relative were the most important determinants of 
the farmer‟s adoption decision.  
Similar to the agricultural examples, a number of factors have been identified as 
important in forestry management investment decisions.  Alig (1986) and Straka et al. (1984) 
found a significant positive relationship between household income and forestry investment. 
Later, however, Kline et al. (2000) found the relationship between income and forestry 
investment to be negative.  Romm et al. (1987) used a logit regression to determine the 
factors that influence private forestry investment in northern California. The results of the 
study confirmed that income, age, and full time residency were the most significant factors in 
explaining forestry investment. More specifically, high income and full time residency were 
positively related to forestry investment, but absentee ownership, middle-ranged incomes, and 
old age were negatively related to the forestry investment. Property size was found to be an 
important factor in explaining investment in timber harvesting, but not in general forestry 
management.  Nagubadi et al. (1996) used a probit model to analyze the participation of 
nonindustrial forest landowners in government forestry programs. The study found that 
property size, ownership reasons, government sources of information, and membership in 
forestry organizations were the most important determinants of program participation. Age, 
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risks associated with the loss of property rights, and years of ownership were also important 
factors.  
In considering the interactions between public and private decision making, Zhang and 
Flick (2001) examined the influence of environmental regulations (i.e., Endangered Species 
Act) and public financial assistance programs on private reforestation behavior. A two-step 
selection model was employed in the analysis. First, a probit model was used to estimate 
reforestation decisions. Second, the residuals from this model were retained and a selection 
model was estimated for the landowners who had replanted by using the level of investment 
as a dependent variable. The results of the probit model showed that the probability of 
reforestation investment was positively related to technical assistance and awareness of cost-
share program, but negatively related to the distance from known endangered species habitats. 
None of the demographic variables, such as income or age, were found to be important factors 
in the reforestation decisions. The results of the selection model showed that the level of 
investment is positively related to the use of reforestation tax incentives and negatively related 
to the use of cost-share subsidies. The later implies a substitution effect between public and 
private capital.  In addition, landowner characteristics such as income, age, and knowledge of 
forestry influenced the decisions about the level of reforestation investment. Income and 
knowledge of forestry were positively related to the level of investment, but age was 
negatively related to the level of investment. Property size was not a significant factor in 
either the probit or selection models.    
In a more recent study, Dhakal et al. (2008) investigated the factors that influence the 
decision of small landowners to invest in forestry plantations in New Zealand.  Using a 
double hurdle model, the authors found that property size, ownership type, period of 
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landholding, land use in dairy production, experience in grain farming, perception about 
forestry tax policy, expectation about future log prices, and percentage of off- farm income 
were the most important predictors of the decision to undertake forestry plantation 
investments. In addition, the study found that property size, perception about forestry tax 
policy, expectation about future log prices, location of the land, and area used in sheep and 
beef production were strong determinants in the decision about the extent of forestry 
plantation investment.  Thus, unlike Zhang and Flick (2001), property size was important in 
both the decision to invest and the level of investment undertaken. Property size was 
positively related to the probability of investing, but negatively related to the extent of 
investment. 
 2.2  Risk Aversion and Investment Decisions 
The majority of the empirical studies summarized in the previous section (with the 
exception of Ervin and Ervin 1982) relied on the assumption that all decision makers are risk 
neutral even though it is likely that this assumption does not match reality. In the context of 
wetland restoration and maintenance, landowners face substantial levels of uncertainty about 
how future climatic, economic, and institutional factors will affect the payoffs from their 
investments. As a result, it is likely that risk aversion plays an important role in a landowner ‟s 
investment decision.  The potential impact of risk aversion on investment decisions in the 
presence of uncertainty has been empirically explored using a variety of frameworks, 
including the expected utility framework (Koundouri et al. 2006; Kim and Chavas 2003; 
Antle 1983) and stochastic dominance analysis (Goldstein et al. 2006; Benitez et al. 2006. 
This section presents a summary of the main findings of these studies and discusses the 
econometric modeling techniques used in the applications. 
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  Stordal et al. (2007) applied stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) to 
analyze the impact of risk aversion on the optimal tree replanting decision. Risk aversion was 
profoundly influential in determining the certainty equivalence for all rotation strategies 
considered. Specifically, the results showed that certainty equivalence was a decreasing 
function of the risk aversion of owners.  The results also indicated that risk-averse forest 
owners chose a higher optimal age of replacement of trees than risk neutral landowners. 
Hence, risk aversion influenced both the optimal tree replacement strategy and the 
reinvestment decision. The authors concluded that risk aversion needs to be considered when 
designing policy measures to influence forestry investments. 
Goldstein et al. (2006) used stochastic dominance (SD) analysis to identify specific 
Koa forestry business strategies that were associated with risk-efficient land-use options in 
Hawaii. The study designed a set of hypothetical business strategies based on income from 
timber harvest, two existing government conservation programs, integrated cattle grazing, and 
selling carbon offset credits. The results of the analysis were based on cumulative net present 
value (NPV) distribution functions of the land-use business strategies generated from Monte 
Carlo simulation, and they showed that business strategies in which the landowners receive 
rental payment plus cost-share assistance were the most efficient. This implies that programs 
like the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) – in which the landowners 
received payment and cost share subsidies – could create viable business strategies for risk-
averse landowners in Hawaii. Benitez et al. (2006) also used stochastic dominance (SD) 
analysis, but in this case to study land allocation problems under risk for shaded coffee 
production in the Choco region of West Ecuador. Study results indicated that shaded coffee is 
not a risk efficient land use, regardless of the degree of diversification. Hence, conservation 
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payments required for preserving shaded coffee would need to be much higher than 
conservation payments calculated under risk neutrality assumptions. These results stressed the 
need for considering risk aversion factors when implementing conservation policy 
instruments.    
In another international context, Hagos and Holden (2006) studied the influence of 
risk aversion, land tenure, public programs, and resource poverty on soil conservation 
investment decisions in northern Ethiopia. The study measured the risk preferences of 
households using hypothetical questions based on a utility function with constant partial risk 
aversion. A Probit model was then used to model the factors that influence the decisions to 
invest in soil conservation, with a subsequent Tobit model employed to model the factors that 
influence the intensity of investment. The authors found that risk aversion played an 
important role in a household‟s decision to intensify soil conservation measures but not in the 
decision to use soil conservation measures. Risk aversion was negatively correlated with the 
level of investment made in soil conservation.  In addition, the study revealed that public 
conservation programs had a positive influence on private investment.  Other factors, 
including land characteristics and the perception of returns on conservation investments, were 
found to be important in a household‟s decision to invest and intensify soil conservation.  
Among the various variables included in of the analyses of technology adoption, risk 
has been recognized as a major factor in the adoption decision (Feder, Just, and Zilberman 
1985).  Saha et al.(1994) developed an empirical and analytical framework for divisible 
technology adoption under  incomplete information diffusion and output uncertainty.  The 
analytical framework showed that neither risk aversion of the producers, nor their risk 
perceptions, should play a role in the adoption decision.  These risk factors, however, should 
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play an important role in the degree of adoption if the producers decided to adopt the 
technology.  Koundouri et al. (2006) extended the theoretical framework of Saha el al. (1994) 
to allow risk aversion and uncertainty to influence the technology adoption decision. The 
model was empirically tested using survey data of irrigation technology adoption practices by 
265 Greece farmers. Using the first four moments of the profit distribution to approximate 
production risk in a logit model, the study found that risk influenced the farmer ‟s decision to 
adopt the new irrigation technology. Specifically, farmers who faced more production risk 
were more likely to adopt new irrigation technology, suggesting that farmers chose to adopt 
new technology in order to hedge against production risk.  In addition, the study found that 
farmers value the prospects of receiving new information to use in their adoption decision 
making. In a more recent paper, Torkamani and Shajari (2008) applied a logit model to 
investigate factors affecting adoption of new irrigation technologies by wheat farmers in three 
major Iranian districts. The study used a moment based approach to estimate the risk premium 
associated with water use, which was then used to estimate the risk attitudes of the farmers. 
Assuming that the risk preferences of the farmers exhibited constant relative risk aversion, the 
results showed that the risk attitudes of farmers have positive and significant effects on the 
decision to adopt new irrigation technologies.  As a result, risk averse farmers were more 
likely to adopt new irrigation technologies that allowed them to save water and reduce 
production risk during the times of water shortage. Beside the risk aversion factor, the study 
found that location, debt level, education, and age were important determinants in the decision 
to adopt new irrigation technologies. Education had a positive effect on the probability of 
adoption and age had a negative effect on the probability of adoption.  Not surprisingly, farms 
located in arid areas were more likely to adopt new water irrigation technologies. 
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 Using as somewhat different approach, Isik and Khanna (2003) employed a nonlinear 
mean-standard deviation expected utility function to determine the impacts of  risk aversion 
and uncertainty about weather and soil conditions on the decision to adopt site-specific 
technologies and the levels of cost-share subsidies required to induce adoption. The study 
found that uncertainty and risk-aversion had negative impacts on adoption decisions such that 
ignoring risk aversion and uncertainty would overestimate the economic and environmental 
benefits of site specific technologies and underestimate the subsidy level required to 
encourage adoption.  Abadi Ghadim et al. (2005) analyzed the importance of uncertainty and 
risk aversion in decisions to adopt crop innovation in Western Australia. Farmers were 
interviewed over a three-year span to elicit their risk preferences and risk perceptions 
concerning a new crop technology for the area (chickpeas). In the survey, farmers were asked 
if they would adopt the new crop and how much area they would devote to it.  Two limited-
dependent variable models (probit and Tobit models) were used to analyze the responses. The 
study found that risk aversion negatively influenced both the decision to adopt and the extent 
of adoption, with risk aversion reducing adoption to a greater extent when both the perceived 
riskiness of the new technology and the area of the farm suitable for chickpeas were large.  
A shortcoming of the empirical studies summarized above (with the exception of 
Koundouri et al. (2006)) is that they ignore the dynamic aspect of the investment decision – a 
factor that might be very important in the context of wetland restoration. Even though these 
empirical models adequately explain why some landowners choose to invest or not to invest 
at a given time, they fail to explain why some landowners choose to delay investment and 
wait for more information. 
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2.3  Option Values and Investment Decisions 
Risk aversion is known to play an important role in static decision making under 
uncertainty, but it may be of less importance in a dynamic context (Knapp and Olson, 1996). 
Instead, the value of information tends to be the most important factor affecting dynamic 
decision making. In option theory literature, the value of information is called the option 
value of an investment and, if measured correctly, can have a profound effect on the decision-
making process of landowners (Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). The majority of the real option 
models have been developed under risk neutral assumptions, and they do not allow the effect 
of risk aversion to be incorporated. This section summarizes the finding of empirical studies 
that have examined the role of option value on investment decisions, particularly in decisions 
similar to those of wetland restoration and maintenance.  
Focusing on the relationship between the option value to convert and the valuation of 
the conservation easements, Tegene et al. (1999) examined decisions to convert farmland to 
urban use using an option value model. .  The study showed that uncertainty and the growth in 
the urban return increase the threshold value of the conversion, so the landowner will not 
convert farmland to urban land use when the value of the land in urban use is equal to the 
direct opportunity cost of the land. Rather, landowners will convert only when urban land 
values exceed the opportunity cost of the land by a large margin. Hence, an increase in 
uncertainty and a growth of returns to urban use tends to increase the value of the convertible 
agricultural land by increasing the land option value, causing a delay in development even for 
a risk-neutral landowner.  This suggests that not incorporating the option values in the 
conservation easements offered to the landowners might under-price the values of the 
conservation easements and make landowners reluctant to sign up  for these easements.  In 
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another study, Quigg (1993) examined the difference in the value of vacant and developed 
land by applying an option values model to a large sample of real estate transactions in 
Seattle.  The author found that the option value associated with uncertainty and irreversibility 
in the decision to develop explains the difference in these values of the different types of land. 
The author calculated a premium for the option value to wait, and found that this option 
premium averaged about 6% with a range from 1% to 30% for the total sample.  
Looking at a more subtle type of land conversion, Schatzki (2003) examined the 
effects of uncertainty and sunk costs on the decisions to convert land from agricultural to 
forestry use using a sample of agricultural plots in the state of Georgia.  Empirical results 
suggested that uncertainty in returns to either forestry or agricultural use increases the 
conversion threshold and thus decreases the likelihood of conversion. The results also showed 
that the higher the correlation between changes in returns to agriculture and forests, the lower 
the conversion threshold, thus increasing the likelihood of conversion. The estimated option 
value for this study ranged from 7% to 81% of the expected value of the land asset.  
In terms of program participation, Isik and Yang (2004) examined the factors affecting 
farmer participation in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) under uncertainty and 
irreversibility using an option value model. Results showed that uncertainty and 
irreversibility, and thus option values, influence farmer decisions to participate in CRP, with 
higher levels of  uncertainty in the returns to agricultural use or the CRP rental payments 
decreasing the likelihood of participation in the CRP. In addition, land benefits, land 
attributes, and farmer characteristics had significant impacts on the participation decision, 
with age, higher production costs, and lower crop revenues increasing the probability of 
participation in the CRP. 
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Option values also play a role in technology adoption decisions.  Winter-Nelson and 
Amegbeto (1998) used an option value model to analyze the impacts of output price 
variability and sunk costs on terrace adoption in eastern Kenya.  Simulation results compared 
the incentives to invest in terraces under both administered and world prices, showing that the 
option value associated with the variability of world prices was an important factor in the 
decision to invest in that the variability of world prices tended to delay terrace adoption in 
Kenya.  Purvis et al. (1995) investigate the impacts of uncertainty about the costs and 
requirements associated with environmental compliance and sunk costs on a producer‟s 
decision to invest in free-stall dairy housing.  Empirical results demonstrated that, even 
though free-stall dairy housing units increased milk production and reduced water pollution, 
the uncertainty about the costs of the system and future environmental regulations 
significantly delayed the adoption decision. More specifically, the simplified net present value 
(NPV) rule predicted that a risk neutral producer will invest in free-stall technology if the 
expected return of investment were equal to $83,448.  The option-value investment rule, 
however, predicted that the producer would wait until the expected return on investment was 
greater than or equal to $190,063.   This example demonstrates that uncertainty can 
substantially increase the hurdle required to trigger adoption.  
Continuing with the adoption theme, Carey and Zilberman (2002) used an option 
value model to determine the effect of input uncertainty and emerging water markets on a 
farmer‟s decision to adopt water irrigation technologies.  The results indicated that farmers 
value the option to wait when making technology adoption decisions, with the risk neutral 
farmer being unwilling to invest in irrigation technologies until the expected value of 
investment exceeds the cost by a large hurdle rate.  Simulation results showed that, according 
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to the net present value (NPV) rule, farms would invest in irrigation technologies if the 
expected NPV was greater than or equal zero and the water market price was greater than or 
equal $48 per unit.  From an option value rule perspective, however, investments would only 
occur if the expected NPV was greater than or equal to $1,594 per acre and the water market 
price reached $112 per unit. Thus, the larger the level of uncertainty, the higher the hurdle rate 
required to trigger adoption. Finally, the study found that the introduction of water markets 
would likely induce farms with accessible water supplies to adopt earlier compared to farms 
with scare water supply.  This outcome was attributed primarily to the lack of a well-
functioning water market.  
In considering conservation measures, Bulte et al. (2002) looked at the optimal 
holding of primary tropical forests in Costa Rica when the future nonuse benefits of forest 
conservation are uncertain and increasing. The authors demonstrated that benefit uncertainty 
has a significant and positive effect on the optimal forest holding stocks, with the option value 
associated with the uncertainty being an important factor to consider.  Thus, using 
deterministic cost-benefit analysis can be misleading because it ignores the fact that the option 
value associated with uncertainty is a component of the return to investment.  The results also 
showed that even though the effect of the uncertainty factor is substantial, rising trend s in 
future benefits and compensation by the international community for beneficial spillovers 
may be more important factors in determining the optimal forest stock.  
In summary, previous studies have found education, technical assistance, conservation 
attitudes, the perception of the erosion problem, and the degree of erosion to have positive 
effects on the landowners‟ investment decisions. Age was negatively related to the decis ion to 
invest in soil conservation and forestry, but it had a mixed sign with respect to the decisions to 
22 
 
participate in government incentive programs. Income and property size did not have 
consistent signs across all studies; however, the majority of the studies found positive 
correlations between the decision to invest and total household income and property size. 
Similarly, results from the literature were not consistent regarding the signs of the variables 
cost-sharing and debt level. They were found to be negatively correlated to the decision to 
invest in some studies and positively related to the decision to invest in other studies. Finally, 
risk aversion was found to negatively influence the level of investment in both soil 
conservation and forestry investment. However, risk aversion was found to have positive 
(negative) effects on the decisions to adopt new technologies depending on whether these 
technologies are risk decreasing or risk increasing.  Some studies found a negative 
relationship between risk aversion and technology adoption, and other studies found a positive 
relationship between risk aversion and technology adoption.   
The discussion in this chapter focused on identifying the landowner and land 
characteristics, along with institutional structures, previously linked to private decisions about 
land use.  The next chapter will present a theoretical model of landowner decision making in 
the face of uncertainty and fixed costs, particularly with respect to how uncertainty about the 
benefits and costs of wetland restoration and maintenance influences a landowner‟s 
investment decision.  
 
  
23 
 
CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
 This chapter presents the development of a theoretical model describing a landowner ‟s 
investment decision making process with respect to investments in wetland restoration and 
maintenance when these decisions are made under uncertainty, irreversibility, and high fixed 
costs. The first section presents a simple wetland restoration model when future benefits and 
costs of wetland restoration and maintenance are known with certainty. The second section 
extends the basic investment model to incorporate the effects of risk and uncertainty through 
risk aversion channels. The next section extends the basic model to include risk and 
uncertainty through the option value of investments, also known in the environmental 
literature as the conditional value of information. The final section extends the model to 
include the effects of some potential subsidy programs.  
3.1 Investment Under Certainty: Net Present Value (NPV) Approach 
 Assume that a risk neutral landowner owns a property size At  at time t. Part of this 
property is wetland, denoted by wt, and the rest of the property (At-wt) is upland. Following 
the Zhao and Zilberman (1999) and Parks (1993) model specifications, let        be the 
private net benefit derived from wetland acreage    .  This net benefit can be written as 
follows: 
                                                                                                                       (1) 
where       is the total revenue and       is the total cost derived from the wetland 
resource.  
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 Now assume that there is wetland loss equal to    . For a risk neutral landowner, the 
decision problem is to choose the optimal level of restoration It that maximizes the present 
value of the expected net benefits from the wetland resource over all future time periods1, or 
     
     
 
   
                                                                                         (2) 
subject to    
       ;      
where E is the expectations operator,  δ is the discount rate,  and    and       are the fixed 
and variable costs (respectively) associated with restoration level    . The constraint defines 
the change in wetland acreage at the end of period t (   
 ). This change is a function of both 
the level of restoration It and the wetland loss   .  The net benefit function      is assumed to 
be increasing and concave in   , so that  
       and         . In addition, the variable cost 
function       is assumed to be increasing and convex in It so that  
        and  
          
for all      . If the cost per unit of wetland restoration is constant, then          . 
 The traditional net present value (NPV) model of investment predicts that the 
landowners will invest in wetland restoration and maintenance activities when the NPV of the 
expected cash flows from the investment exceeds the cost of the investment. Therefore, the 
landowner will invest in wetland restoration and maintenance if      , and he/she will not 
invest in wetland restoration and maintenance if       .  Thus, the landowner maximization 
problem for each time period can be expressed as follows: 
       
                                                                                                               (3) 
                                                                 
1
 The plus infinity symbol   that was used in the  net present value function represents the end of the 
landowner‟s planning horizon  
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subject to    
        
The landowner‟s optimal wetland restoration level can then be found by solving the 
Hamiltonian function: 
                                                                                                     (4) 
whose first-order conditions for  maximization are: 
    
      
   
 
      
   
                                                                                                 (4.1) 
    
      
   
                                                                                                             (4.2) 
         
      
   
                                                                                                         (4.3) 
                                                                                                                                (4.4)                
From equations 4.1 and 4.2, the landowner will choose a level of restoration that satisfies the 
following relationship: 
      
   
 
      
   
 
      
   
                                                                                                     (5) 
The term in the left hand side (LHS) of equation (5) can be interpreted as the marginal 
benefits associated with restoration level    ,  while the first term on the right hand side (RHS) 
can be interpreted as the marginal cost associated with restoration level    .  The second term 
on the RHS can be interpreted as the marginal negative benefits (i.e., costs) associated with αt 
wetland loss. Thus, equation (5) states that under certainty, a landowner will optimize NPV by 
choosing a level of restoration        
  that equates the marginal benefit of restoration with the 
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marginal cost of restoration plus the marginal negative benefit associated with wetland loss     
that might occur in the absence of no action. On the other hand, the landowner will prefer not 
to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance if the additional benefit of restoration is less 
than the sum of the marginal cost of restoration plus marginal negative benefit associated with 
wetland loss. 
3.2 Investment under Uncertainty 
 The simple NPV model has a major shortcoming in that it ignores the role of risk and 
uncertainty in the decision-making process. In the context of coastal wetland restoration, 
several sources of uncertainty can arise. First, there is uncertainty associated with changes in 
the global climate that may result in sea level rise and/or adverse weather variations, such as 
the increased frequency of hurricanes and storms. Currently, sea-level rise is estimated to be 
approximately 1cm/yr, and this rate is expected to increase to 30 to 50cm by the end of 21st 
century (Day et al. 2005). The potential impact of future sea level rise on wetland restoration 
and maintenance projects is unknown at the time the investment decisions are made. The 
same can be said for the uncertainty associated with the use and performance of various 
wetland restoration technologies. Another possible source of uncertainty is related to future 
changes in wetland regulation and incentive policies. The evolution of these policies over 
time will almost certainly influence the ultimate benefits and costs generated by current 
wetland restoration and maintenance projects.  
 The uncertainty associated with climate change, restoration technologies, and wetland 
policy can influence the landowner‟s decision process through several channels. First, risk 
averse landowners might prefer not to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance activities 
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because such investments would expose them to high levels of income risks even if they can 
realize higher average returns under the investments (Arrow, 1971, Pratt 1964). On the other 
hand, risk-averse landowners who have faced continuous wetland losses might consider 
investing in wetland restoration projects in order to reduce the risk of losing more wetlands in 
the future. In this case, the benefits of wetland restoration and maintenance potentially include 
loss-based risk reduction. In addition to the uncertainty factor, investment in wetland 
restoration and maintenance incurs fixed and variable costs that might be quite high due to the 
need for extensive water control structures and compliance with wetland regulatory 
constraints. Zhao and Zilberman (1999) demonstrated, using dynamic analysis, that high fixed 
costs reduces the level of private restoration for each time period.  In fact, if the fixed costs 
are high enough, it can lead to a complete lack of private restoration regardless of the 
magnitude of marginal costs. This combination of uncertainty and fixed costs implies that 
additional information about the future benefits and costs of wetland restoration and 
maintenance might have positive economic value. Therefore, a risk neutral landowner should 
prefer to delay investment in wetland restoration and maintenance in order to gain more 
information and avoid the downside risk of a costly restoration project (Arrow and Fisher 
1973; Henry 1974; Fisher and Hanemann 1990; Dixit and Pindyck 1994).  Consequently, a 
simple NPV rule tends to underestimate the required trigger value for an uncertain investment 
decision, and it might lead to an early or overinvestment. In the next section, the NPV model 
is extended to account for the importance of risk aversion.  
 3.2.1. The Role of Risk Aversion 
 At the time a landowner makes the decision to invest in wetland restoration projects, the 
expected net benefit of a wetland restoration project is subject to several sources of 
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uncertainty including future climate change, future changes in wetland policy, and future 
improvement of wetland restoration technology. For the sake of this discussion, assume that 
the main source of uncertainty the landowner faces is the uncertainty about future climate 
change, and this uncertainty is represented by a random variable   with the distribution 
density function     . To account for the effects of risk aversion and uncertainty on the 
landowner‟s investment decision, the landowner‟s objective function described in equation (2) 
must be restructured to incorporate the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function (u) for the 
net benefit of wetland restoration. The landowner‟s decision problem is to choose the optimal 
level of restoration It that maximizes the present value of the expected utility of the net 
benefits from the wetland, or 
     
      
 
   
                                                                                    (6) 
subject to    
        
where E is the expectation operator, u(.) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function that 
is continuous and twice differentiable, with positive first derivatives ( 'u ). The sign of the 
second derivative ( "u ) is negative for a risk-averse landowner and positive for a risk-taking 
landowner.  Based on this model specification, investment in wetland restoration and 
maintenance occurs only if the expected discounted utility of the benefits of wetland 
restoration exceeds the discounted utility of the restoration costs (i.e., V2>0).  
 The landowner maximization problem for each time period can be expressed as follows: 
         
                                                                                                      (7) 
subject to    
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The Hamiltonian function for this dynamic problem is: 
                                                                                                 (8) 
with the first-order conditions for  maximization  
       
     
       
   
 
      
   
                                                                           (8.1) 
       
    
       
   
                                                                                           (8.2) 
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                                                                                                                                (8.4) 
Equations (8.1) and (8.2) can be combined to yield 
        
       
   
 
      
   
            
       
   
                                                            (9) 
Using the property of the expected value of the product of two random variables,  
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Simplifying  
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or 
  
        
   
    
      
   
    
        
   
  
 
           
      
   
             
       
   
             
       
   
 
      
                                 (12) 
The term on the LHS of equation (11) is the expected marginal benefits associated with 
restoration level    .  The first term on the RHS is the expected marginal cost associated with 
restoring     acres of wetland, while the second term is the expected marginal negative benefit 
(costs) associated with αt wetland loss.  The third term on the RHS is different from zero in 
the uncertainty case and measures the deviation of the risk-averse landowner from a risk-
neutral landowner. It represents the additional cost of risk and it is a function of both the risk 
preference of the landowner (captured by the curvature of the utility function) and the 
variability of the net benefit represented by the variance of the net benefit. This tern will be 
positive for a risk averse landowner and negative for a risk taker landowner.  In this 
formulation, a landowner will choose the optimal level of restoration according to the 
expected net benefit of wetland restoration, expected cost of wetland restoration, negative 
opportunity cost of wetland loss, risk preference, and the variability of wetland net benefit. 
Therefore, a risk-averse landowner will invest in wetland restoration and maintenance as long 
as the expected marginal benefit of wetland restoration exceeds the expected marginal cost 
plus the expected negative marginal benefit and an additional risk premium associated with 
wetland investment.    
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3.2.2  The Value of Information (Option Value Approach) 
Investment in wetland restoration and maintenance has all three characteristics that 
define real options.  First, the decision to invest is, in general, irreversible because it involves 
considerable (in fact, a high percentage of) fixed and variable costs that cannot be totally 
recovered if the investment decision is reversed.  Second, the decision to invest in wetland 
restoration and maintenance is uncertain because the economic and environmental conditions 
that influence the return on investment are uncertain, with information about these conditions 
only arriving gradually in the future.  Third, the landowner has the choice to delay investment 
in wetland restoration and maintenance and wait for more information to arrive before 
undertaking costly restoration projects. When the conditions of irreversibility, uncerta inty and 
the ability to wait are met, the decisions are said to entail an option value, where it pays for 
the landowners to delay investments and wait for more information in order to avoid the 
downside risk (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). Investment in wetland restoration and maintenance 
should occur only when the discounted cash flows from the investment exceed the costs of the 
investment by a large hurdle equal to the value of the option to invest in the future; a value 
known in the environmental preservation literature as the quasi-option value (Arrow and 
Fisher, 1973; Henry, 1974). The quasi-option value (or option value) measures the value of 
information conditional on delaying investment in the first period. The higher the prospect of 
receiving new information about future returns of investment, the more likely the landowners 
will delay partial investments in order to remain flexible and make use of the new 
information.  
In order to account for the option value associated with wetland restoration decisions, 
the landowner‟s decision model can be based on real option theory (ROT) for investments 
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under uncertainty and irreversibility (Arrow and Fisher, 1973; Henry, 1974; Dixit & Pindyck, 
1994; Epstein, 1980). Several authors have used  ROT models for analyzing investment 
decisions,  including those associated with technology adoption ( Carey and Zilberman, 2002; 
Isik 2004; Isik et al., 2001,; Koundouri et al., 2006; Winter-Nelson and Amegbeto, 1998), 
land use change (Capozza and Li, 1994; Capozza and Hensley, 1990; Capozza and Sick, 
1994; Geltner et al., 1996; Plantinga et al. 2002; Purvis et al., 1995; Tengene et al. 1999; 
Wiemers and Behan, 2004), program participation by farmers (Isik and Yang, 2004), and 
forest conservation (Bulte et al., 2002), and wetland investment (Paulsen, 2007).   
 In order to examine a similar model in the context of wetland restoration, assume that 
a risk neutral landowner holds a property size At at time t. Part of this property is wetland, 
denoted by wt , and the rest of the property (At-wt) is upland.  Let         be the private net 
benefit derived from wetland acreage    at time t, where the value of  
  is a function of 
several exogenous factors such as global climate change, changes in wetland policies, and 
restoration technologies. Also assume that new information about the uncertain benefit of 
wetland restoration will gradually become available, so that this benefit might be modeled 
using a geometric Brownian motion: 
                                                                                                                       (13) 
where α and σ are the growth rate and the variation in the growth rate of the wetland 
restoration benefit, respectively.  Define          as the increment of the Weiner process, 
and          .  Thus, equation (13) implies that the current net benefits of wetland 
restoration and maintenance are known, but future benefits are changing at rate α (Dixit & 
Pindyck (1994)).  Investing in wetland restoration and maintenance also requires 
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consideration of the fixed and variable costs (   and         respectively), where C denotes 
the total investment costs equal to the sum of the variable and fixed costs. Taking the benefits 
and costs together, the option to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance is then equal to 
the maximum difference between the discounted net benefit of investment and the cost of the 
investment  
            
         
                                                                                    (14) 
where E denotes the expectations operator, T is the unknown future time that the landowner 
will start the restoration project,        is the net benefit of the wetland restoration at the 
time of restoration T, and δ is the discount rate.  In order for investment in wetland restoration 
to be optimal, we assumed that δ> α which implies that the trend in the net benefit of wetland 
restoration should always be less than the discount rate. The goal, then, is to solve equation 
(14) to find the optimal value B* that maximizes the option value of investment in wetland 
restoration and maintenance F(B).  
Dixit & Pindyck (1994) use a dynamic programming approach to solve for optimal 
investment regions in problems like the one specified above, and they found that the optimal 
solution can be expressed as: 
   
 
   
                                                                                                                            (15) 
where C is the cost of the restoration investment and β is a function of the discount rate, drift 
and volatility of the stochastic process   .  The term 
 
   
 has a value greater than 1 and 
measures the importance of uncertainty in the investment decision. Specifically, in the 
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presence of uncertainty, one would invest in wetland restoration and maintenance when the 
net benefits of the investment exceed the investment cost by a hurdle rate equal to the option 
value of investment.  Dixit & Pindyck (1994) go on to show that the critical value of the 
investment B* is increasing in the volatility of the growth rate (σ) and trend (α) of net benefit 
 Although this modeling approach is appealing, it is difficult to test the model‟s 
implications because of the intense data requirements. Thus, the majority of studies regarding 
land use under uncertainty and irreversibility tended to rely on simulation frameworks, where 
Mont-Carlo or other simulation methods are used to test the implication of the ROT model. 
3.3. Implications for a Potential Wetland Restoration Policy 
Caffey et al. (2003) listed several policy instruments that can be used to encourage 
private wetland restoration in the coastal zone, including cost-sharing subsidies, tax reduction, 
wetland mitigating banking, and carbon credits. As an example of how these can be 
incorporated into the theoretical model, consider the effects of cost-sharing subsidies such as 
the one offered under Wetland Reserve Program (WRP) or Conservation Reserve Program 
(CRP).  Under the WRP, landowners can enter a contract agreement with the government to 
reach certain restoration goals, and in exchange they receive rental payments over the contract 
period. The program also pays a portion of the total restoration costs. It is worth mentioning 
that subsidy programs such as WRP and CRP were largely designed to address the issue of 
wetland restoration for land that was devoted to agricultural uses, but modified versions of 
these programs can potentially be used to address the issue of wetland restoration in the 
coastal zone (Ryan and Susman, 2003).   
35 
 
 Suppose that a coastal landowner participates in a cost sharing program similar to one 
under the WRP, where the landowner will receive a dollar rental payment equal to s per acre 
over the contract period k, and the program will pay a portion γ of the total restoration costs. 
The landowner‟s decision problem, including the new benefits of the subsidy program, can be 
expressed as follows: 
     
      
 
   
        
                                                                         (16) 
subject to    
        
The landowner‟s maximization problem for each time period can be expressed as: 
         
            
                                            (17) 
subject to    
        
Notice that the cost-share subsidy program adds two terms to the maximization problem – the   
cost share portion that the pays              and the rental payment over the contract 
period k,                    . 
Setting the Hamiltonian function to solve the optimization problem in equation 17 yields: 
                  
                                   
                                                                                                                                   (18) 
36 
 
The first-order conditions for maximization can then be expressed as: 
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                                                                                             (18.2) 
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                                                                                                                                (18.4) 
Combining equations (18.1) and (18.2) yields 
        
        
   
                         
      
   
   
          
       
   
                                                                                                             (19) 
Then, using the property of the expected value of the product of two random variables,  
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Simplifying yields 
  
       
   
    
      
   
    
       
   
                      
   
      
   
   
           
       
   
             
       
   
                         
      
   
 
      
 (22) 
 The term on the LHS of the equation above is the expected marginal benefits associated 
with restoration level   .  The first term on the RHS is the expected marginal cost associated 
with restoring     acres of wetland, while the second term is the expected marginal negative 
benefit associated with αt wetland loss.  The third term on the RHS is the increase in the 
marginal benefit of wetland restoration due to cost-share subsidy programs. The last term on 
the RHS is non-zero to the extent that it measures the deviation of the risk-averse landowner 
from a risk-neutral landowner. It represents the additional cost of risk and it is negative for a 
risk averse landowner, and positive for a risk taker landowner. From equation (22), the 
subsidy payment                     and the cost share payment    
      
   
    lower the 
hurdle rate for investment in wetland restoration and maintenance. Therefore, the subsidy 
program should encourage private landowners to undertake wetland restoration and 
maintenance. 
This chapter presented the conditions under which the landowners would invest in 
wetland restoration and maintenance, finding that uncertainty and fixed costs can play 
important role in the decision making process.  In a static setting, risk-aversion influences the 
trigger value of the decision to invest in wetland restoration projects. However, in a dynamic 
setting, the option value of investment under uncertainty influences the decision making 
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process of the landowners.  The remainder of the dissertation develops these ideas in an 
empirical context with the goal of testing the theoretical implications of this model structure.  
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The theoretical framework for the landowners‟ decisions to invest in wetland 
restoration and maintenance in the presence of risk and uncertainty was developed in both 
static and dynamic contexts. The static framework emphasized the role of risk aversion in the 
decision process, while the dynamic framework emphasized the role of option value in the 
decision process. This chapter develops an empirical model for the factors that influence 
decisions to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance. Given that the data for the study 
came from a cross sectional survey, the empirical model focuses on analyzing the factors that 
influence the landowner‟s decision to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance in the 
presence of risk and uncertainty at the time the survey was taken. Hence, the model developed 
here is grounded in the static framework approach and emphasizes the important role of risk 
aversion and fixed costs in the landowners‟ decision process.   
The majority of studies that have looked at factors influencing private investments in 
resource stocks similar to wetlands have either used discrete choice models with probit or 
logit estimators (Romm et al., 1987; Soule et al., 2000; Koundouri et al., 2006) or a corner 
solution model employing a Tobit model (Norris and Batie, 1987; Featherstone and Goodwin, 
1993; Hagos and Holden, 2006). The first modeling approach provides useful information on 
how different characteristics of the landowners and their wetland tracts influence the 
probability of investment in wetland restoration and maintenance, but it does not provide 
information on the impact of these factors on the level of investment in wetland restoration 
and maintenance. Since the objective of this study was to provide information on the level-of-
investment decision, using a discrete choice model is not optimal. The Tobit model, on the 
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other hand, is particularly useful for analyzing the impacts of landowners‟ characteristic and 
their properties on the probability and the level of investment in wetland res toration and 
maintenance. In addition, the marginal effects calculated from the estimated Tobit model can 
be used to predict the effects of changing the levels of explanatory variables on both the 
amount of investment and the probability of investment. The Tobit model, however, is very 
restrictive in its parameterization. First, it assumes that the same stochastic process influences 
the probability of investment and the level of investment. Second, all zero observations of the 
dependent variable are attributed to corner solutions (Blundell and Meghir, 1987; Moffatt, 
2005). Because of these limitations, we explore an alternative approach to modeling the data 
structure  – the double-hurdle model. The double-hurdle model generalizes the Tobit model by 
introducing an additional hurdle which must be passed before observing any positive 
investments. The additional hurdle uses a probit estimator to model the decision to 
invest(discrete variable); therefore, zero observations on the dependent variable can be either 
attributed to corner solutions or nonparticipation in the market ( i.e., landowners have never 
invested in wetland restoration projects). In doing so, the double hurdle model also allows the 
decision to invest in wetland restoration and the level of investments to be treated separately. 
Therefore, a separate stochastic process can be used to model the probability of investment 
and the level of investment (Carroll et al., 2005). 
After briefly introducing the underlying theory of the Tobit model and its limitations, 
the discussion in this chapter turns to the double hurdle model as an alternative to the Tobit. 
Also presented is a brief section on how the marginal effects are computed and the associated 
standard errors for statistical inferences. To close, the last section of the chapter discusses the 
issues of heteroskedasticity and non-normality of the error terms in the double hurdle model.  
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4.1 The Tobit Model 
Estimating an econometric model of landowner decisions to invest in wetland 
restoration and maintenance is complicated by the relatively large number of zero 
observations that are usually observed in the dependent variable (i.e., level of private 
investment in wetland restoration and maintenance).  When the dependent variable is limited 
in such a way, analyzing the data using ordinary least square (OLS) may result in biased and 
inconsistent estimated parameter (Amemiya, 1984).  Discarding zero observations of the 
dependent variable is not a viable solution, as doing so and using OLS only with positive 
values of the dependent variable increases the potential bias and inefficiency while ignoring 
potentially valuable information embedded in the zero observation responses. (Amemiya, 
1984).  To address these limitations, Tobin (1958) crafted an approach that came to be known 
as the Tobit model.  To account for the censored nature of data, the Tobit model expresses the 
observed response variable y in terms of an underlying latent variable: 
     
      if     
    
            (23) 
      if     
    
                      (24) 
         
   
where   
   is a latent variable describing the level of investment for landowner  ,    is the 
actual level of investment for  a landowner  , xi is a vector of potential explanatory variables 
that influence the landowner‟s decisions to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance, β is 
a vector of the associated parameters, and     is the error term.  The density of    given  x i is 
the same as the density of   
   given x i for  positive observations, so the probability that    
equals 0 can be expressed as  
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           (25) 
where  (.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution.  
The most common approach to estimating the Tobit model is the maximum likelihood 
estimator. First, the observations are divided into two groups; censored observations (zero 
values of the dependent variable) and the observed positive values of the dependent variable. 
The log likelihood function for the Tobit model is expressed as follows: 
               
  
  
 
        
 
 
  
     
  
 
       (26) 
where  (.) and φ(.)  are the standard  normal  cumulative distribution and the standard normal 
density functions, “0” indicates summation over zero observations, and “+”  indicates the 
summation over positive observations(Greene, 2003). 
The parameter estimates of the Tobit model provide little value besides indicating the 
significance of the explanatory variable and, if significant, the direction (positive or negative) 
of its influence on the dependent variable. Thus, marginal effects are calculated from the 
estimated model to more fully understand the magnitude of the relationship between the 
explanatory and dependent variables. Using the McDonald and Moffitt (1980) decomposition, 
the unconditional expected value of the double hurdle model was expressed by Wooldridge 
(2002) as 
                                             (27) 
From equation (23), the probability of observing a positive investment level for landowner   is 
                            
           (28) 
while the conditional expected value of    given that      is 
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                         (29) 
where  (.) is the inverse mills ratio       
    
    
  .  Using the McDonald and Moffitt (1980) 
decomposition, the unconditional expected value of     that measures the overall  investment 
level is  
              
        
         
                  (30) 
Taking the first derivative of equations (28), (29), and (30) with respect to the explanatory 
variable xj then gives the marginal effects on the probability of investment and the conditional 
and unconditional level of investments. Thus, the marginal effect of the variable xj  on the 
probability of investment is 
           
   
           
                 (31) 
the conditional marginal effect of the variable xj is 
             
   
          
        
         
              (32)  
and the unconditional marginal effect of the variable x j is 
         
   
        
               (33)   
The Tobit model suffers from a number of limitations associated with its underlying 
assumptions. First, the model is very restrictive in its parameterization because it assumes that 
the same stochastic process determines both the value of the continuous dependent variable 
(level of private investments in wetland restoration and maintenance) and the value of the 
discrete dependent variable (the decision to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance). 
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This assumption is very restrictive because the factors that affect a landowner‟s decision to 
invest in wetland restoration and maintenance (i.e., the characteristics of the landowners and 
their properties) might differ significantly from the factors that influence a landowner‟s 
decision about how much to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance. Furthermore, the 
same stochastic process assumption implies that if a particular variable is known to have a 
positive effect on investment level, then a high value for this variable will inevitably lead to 
the prediction of a high probability of investment (Blundell and Meghir, 1987; Moffatt, 2005). 
Second, the Tobit model assumes that all zero observations are standard corner solutions or 
negative values of the underlying latent variable (Blundell and Meghir, 1987). In the context 
of our study, it is possible to imagine cases where the landowners do not invest in wetland 
restoration and maintenance for reasons beyond simple economic factors such as income and 
relative prices.  For example, landowners might decide not to invest in wetland restoration 
and maintenance because they don‟t believe a wetland restoration technology exists to do the 
task or because they do not believe that they are responsible for restoration, especially 
considering that the majority of wetland benefits are public in nature (Heimlich et al. 1998). It 
is also possible that landowners may perceive wetland investment to be beneficial (i.e., 
positive value of the latent variable), but for other unmeasured reasons choose not to invest, 
thus yielding zero values for the dependent variable.  
Unlike the Tobit model, the double-hurdle model allows the decision to invest in 
wetland restoration and the level of investments to be treated separately. Therefore, a separate 
stochastic process can be used to model the probability of investment and the level of 
investments. The next section presents the general function of the double hurdle model and 
discusses its underlying assumptions.  
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4.2  Double Hurdle Model 
 The double hurdle model proposed by Cragg (1971) generalizes the Tobit model by 
introducing an additional hurdle which must be passed before observing any positive 
investments. Conceptually, a landowner first decides whether or not to invest in wetland 
restoration and maintenance.  Then, if the decision is made to invest, the landowner decides 
how much to invest. A different latent variable is used to model each decision process, with a 
probit estimator used to model the participation decision and a Tobit estimator used to model 
the level of investment decision (Blundell and Meghir, 1987).2 Therefore, the double hurdle 
model allows for the possibility that factors affecting the decision to invest in wetland 
restoration and maintenance might differ from factors that affect the level of investment 
decision. For example, fixed costs may affect the decisions to invest in wetland restoration 
and maintenance, but they may not affect the decisions about how much to invest. In addition, 
the double-hurdle model allows the same explanatory variable to have different impacts on 
the decisions to invest and the level of investment.  
Unlike the Tobit model, which assumes that all zero observation on the dependent 
variable are attributed to corner solutions, the double hurdle model allows zero observations 
on the dependent variables to be caused by either a simple corner solution (negative value for 
the underlying latent dependent variable) or non-participation in the market (i.e., landowner 
decides not to invest in wetland restoration projects for some non-modeled reasons) (Moffatt, 
2005; Carroll et al., 2005). The general equations of the double-hurdle model can expressed 
as follows: 
                                                                 
2
 The double hurdle model uses a probit model, and not a logit model, in the first stage because the normality 
assumption of the error term matches the underlying assumption for the Tobit model. Since both the decision to 
invest and how much to invest are based on the same underlying utility function, then the error terms in both 
model should follow the same d istributional assumptions. 
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       : first hurdle equation (investment decision)       (34) 
   
    
      : second hurdle equation  (investment level decision)       (35) 
     
      if    
    and    
                     (36) 
      otherwise                                       (37) 
          ,         
    
where    
   is a  latent variable  representing  the decision to invest in wetland restoration and 
maintenance for a landowner  ,    
  is a latent variable representing the level of investment for 
a landowner   ,    is the observed level of investment for  a landowner  ,  zi is a vector of 
potential explanatory variables that influence the   landowner‟s decision to invest in wetland 
restoration and maintenance, xi  is a vector of explanatory variables that affect the 
landowner‟s level of investment, and α and β are vectors of  parameter. In this formulation, (zi 
; xi ) may contain the same common explanatory variables, although their corresponding 
effects on the two hurdle equations might be quite different.  The terms             are normal 
and independently distributed error terms such that               (Carroll et al., 2005).  
As might be apparent from this discussion, the Tobit model is just a special case of the 
double-hurdle model, where zi = x i  and α = β/σ.  As a result, the model specification of the 
double-hurdle model can be tested against the Tobit model using a likelihood ratio test (LR). 
The LR test compares the log- likelihood values of the two models and determines if they are 
significantly different from each other (Wooldridge, 2002). The result of this test can be used 
to determine whether the landowners make investment decisions in a sequential or 
simultaneous manner.  If the LR test rejects the null hypothesis of a univariate Tobit, then the 
double-hurdle model is preferred and landowners are found to make investment decisions in a 
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sequential two-step process.  If, however, the null hypothesis is not rejected, then landowners 
are found to make investment decision in a simultaneous manner and the univariate Tobit is a 
better representation of the data.   
As in the Tobit model case, the most common method for estimating the double-
hurdle model is the maximum likelihood estimator, and its general log- likelihood function can 
be expressed as follows (Cragg, 1971): 
 
               
     
  
  
 
            
   
 
 
  
     
  
 
    (38) 
where “0” indicates summation over zero observations, “+”  indicates the summation over 
positive observations, and   (.) and φ(.)  are the standard  normal  cumulative distribution and 
the standard normal density function, respectively.   
Similar to the Tobit model, the parameter estimates of the double hurdle model 
provide little direct information beyond the significance and direction of influence for each 
explanatory variable, resulting in the need for marginal effect calculations. Using the 
McDonald and Moffitt (1980) decomposition, the unconditional expected value of the double 
hurdle model can be expressed as (Jensen and Yen, 1996) 
                                          (39) 
where             is the probability of investment and                 is the conditional 
expected value of investment (i.e., the level of investment conditional on having made the 
choice to invest).  Following Burke‟s (2009) notation, the probability of investment is  
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               (40)   
.From the Tobit model in the second-hurdle, the conditional expected value of y given that 
y>0 is 
                
         
                          (41) 
where λ(.) is the inverse Mills ratio.  After substituting equations (40) and (41) into equation 
(39), the unconditional expected value of  y can be expressed as follows 
             
      
         
                      (42)    
Taking the first derivative of equations (40), (41), and (42)  with respect to the explanatory 
variable xj  yields the double-hurdle marginal effects of the explanatory variable xj on the 
probability of investment and the conditional and unconditional level of investments.  So, the 
marginal effect of the explanatory variable xj on the probability of investment is expressed as 
           
   
       
                (43)    
and the conditional marginal effect of the explanatory variable xj  given that landowners have 
made a positive investment is 
              
   
          
        
         
                (44)   
and the unconditional marginal effect of the explanatory variable xj  is 
            
   
        
      
         
       
                        
             
        
         
                   (45)   
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Although having the calculated marginal effects is useful, for statistical inference there 
is a need for the standard errors of the estimated marginal effects. These standard errors can 
be approximated using the delta method.  Denoting the parameter estimates of the double 
hurdle model by the vector              and the estimated marginal effect for a given 
continuous variable    in the model by the function          , the estimated variance of the 
marginal effect     using the delta method can be expressed as (Wooldridge, 2002): 
         
      
   
    
      
   
 
 
          (46)    
where    is the asymptotic variance of the maximum likelihood estimator for    and the 
standard errors can be computed using the square root of the equation above. This procedure 
is employed by the „nlcom’ subroutine in STATA to calculate the standard errors for the 
estimated marginal effects of the double hurdle model.  
4.3  Heteroskedasticity and Non-normality 
The maximum likelihood estimates of the double hurdle model are derived under the 
assumption that the error terms     and    are homoskedastic. In the case of cross-sectional 
data, this homoskedasticity assumption is likely to be violated, leading to a situation where 
the maximum likelihood estimation produces inconsistent parameter estimates (Arabmazer 
and Schmidt, 1981; Maddala, 1975; Hurd, 1979). Arabmazer and Schmidt (1981) investigated 
the impact of heteroskedasticity in the Tobit model and found that the size of inconsistency3 
increases with heteroskedasticity and the degree of censoring. Hurd (1979) found that 
                                                                 
3
 Consistency is a very important characteristic of any estimator. It reflects the behavior of the sampling 
distribution of the estimator as the sample size increases. An estimator is said to be consistent if it converges to 
the parameter estimates of the true population value of the parameter as the sample size increases indefinitely 
(Wooldridge,2002) 
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moderate heteroskedasticity in the errors will cause substantial inconsistency in the parameter 
estimates. One way to overcome the inconsistency is by assuming that the standard deviation 
of the error term is a function of a set of exogenous variables     
          
     (47) 
where     might contain all  continuous variables in    or just a subset of the continuous 
variables suspected for heteroskedasticity and δ is a conformable parameter vector (Su and 
Yen, 1996; Jenson and Yen, 1996).  A likelihood ratio test (LR) can be used to test the 
restrictions (Ho:  =0) against the alternative that  is not 0. A rejection of this test indicates 
that the errors are heteroskedastic. 
Similar to the case of heteroskedasticity, the maximum likelihood estimates of the 
double hurdle model are very sensitive to the normality assumptions concerning the error 
terms    and   . If normality is violated, the maximum likelihood approach produces 
inconsistent parameter estimates (Arabmazer and Schmidt, 1982). One way of dealing with 
the non-normality issue is to use a logarithmic transformation of the dependent variable, but 
this option is not appropriate in the presence of a large number of zero observations. Another 
way to account for non-normal errors is to use a Box-Cox transformation of the dependent 
variable, often expressed as (Jenson and Yen, 1996) 
  
  
  
   
 
                (48) 
Notice that the logarithmic and the linear transformations are special cases of the Box-Cox 
transformation when   =0 , and  =1, respectively. In general, however,   would be expected 
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to take on a value between zero and one (Moffatt, 2005).  The log likelihood function of the 
double hurdle model after applying the Box-Cox transformation can be expressed as 
               
     
  
   
 
 
 
            
     
     
 
  
  
    
  
 
        (49)   
 This chapter presented two potential models (Tobit and the double hurdle) that can be 
used to investigate landowners‟ decisions concerning investment in wetland restoration 
projects. The next chapter examines the process used to collect the data needed to statistically 
estimate these models and gives an over-review of the data itself.  
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CHAPTER 5  
 SURVEY DESIGN AND DATA SUMMARY 
Chapter 4 presented an empirical framework for modeling the landowner decision 
making process with respect to wetland restoration and maintenance. From the theoretical 
framework discussed in Chapter 3, risk aversion becomes a key determinant of the 
landowners‟ investment decisions. In order to test this theoretical hypothesis, however, a 
measure of the risk preferences for private landowners is required. A survey of coastal 
landowners in Louisiana was conducted in the fall of 2009 in order to elicit these risk 
preferences. Three different risk preference elicitation methods were used in the survey: 1) a 
self ranking question on risk preference; 2) a multi- item scale approach; and 3) the expected 
utility framework through hypothetical investments distributions with different levels of risk 
and expected net returns. The survey was also used to collect other information regarding 
landowners‟ investment decisions, their socioeconomic characteristics, and the characteristics 
of landholdings.  This chapter describes the survey process and presents a descriptive analysis 
of the response.  The chapter begins with an examination of the survey design and discusses 
the general response characteristics.  Next, the risk preference elicitation methods that were 
used are described.  Finally,  a summary of the survey data is presented.  
5.1  Survey Design and Response 
  The survey questionnaire (see Appendix A) was designed using Dillman‟s (1978) total 
design method for mail surveys. A mailing list of private wetland landowners in coastal 
Louisiana was obtained from the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (LADNR) 
geographic information system (GIS) database. This database covers all coastal wetland 
landowners who may have potentially been affected by wetlands loss and/or publically funded 
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wetlands restoration and maintenance activities. In it raw form, the GIS database provided by 
LADNR had 721 landowners with wetland properties in the coastal zone. However, after 
eliminating duplicate names, names without mailing addresses, and publicly owned properties 
(such as state-owned wildlife refuges), the mailing list contained a total of 591 landowners.  
 Using the 591 landowners as the sample frame, we stratified landowners into three 
groups based on the number of wetland tracts they owned. The first group included all 
landowners with only one tract of land. The second group included all landowners with two 
tracts, and the third group included all landowners with more than two tracts (with this latter 
group mainly consisting of large corporations). This stratification of the sample based on the 
number of tracts was used for several reasons. First, the survey questionnaire asked questions 
that are specific to a tract of land, such as the level of investment that was made, income 
derived from the land, land use, and the level of wetland loss. Because a landowner with 
multiple land tracts might make different investment decisions for each tract, it was important 
to have the landowner focus on a specific tract when answering the questionnaire.  Second, 
stratification (and more specifically, having the responses tied to a specific tract of land) 
allowed the response data to be merged with the LADNR GIS information for a land tract 
(i.e., location of the land tract, distance from the shoreline, wetland loss, wetland area, and 
wetland type).  
 For this study, the survey questionnaires were mailed to landowners with one or two 
tracts of land (groups one and two).  As mentioned early, the third group of landowners 
consists mainly of large corporations, and they were excluded from this study in part due to 
the difficulty in conceptualizing a way to elicit risk preferences from an entity other than an 
individual.  The behavior of these large landholders is certainly of interest when considering 
54 
 
coastal wetland restoration and maintenance, and future research will need to focus on this 
problem.  
 In early fall of 2009, a pre-test version of the survey questionnaire was mailed to a 
random sample of 30 private landowners who owned one tract of land (group 1). Based on the 
result of this pre-test, changes were made to the survey questionnaires and a final version was 
mailed out to all landowners in the sample frame who owned one or two tracts of land (groups 
1 and 2). In total, the survey was mailed to a sample size of 378 private landowners. 4 Each 
survey questionnaire included an aerial photography map of the landowner‟s property with 
location data identified (see figure 5.1 for an example of one of these maps). For landowners 
with two tracts of land, they were given two separate maps (one for each tract) and asked to 
select the tract of land that they were going to use when answering the survey questionnaire. 
As a result, all survey questions that were land-specific referred to well- identified tracts, and 
thus could be related (both for this study and in the future) to biophysical features tracked by 
other scientific studies.   
 The survey questionnaire consisted of five sections with a total of 37 questions. The first 
section of the survey included a range of questions concerning the participation of the 
landowners in government programs, their attitudes toward wetland restoration, and their 
attitudes toward various incentive instruments for wetland restoration. More specifically, 
landowners were asked about their general attitudes toward wetland restoration, whether they 
were aware of any wetland restoration programs in their areas, and if so, whether they had 
                                                                 
4
 The entire survey process involved the following steps. A pre-notification postcard was sent to all private 
landowners, followed by a first mailing of the questionnaire; thank you reminder postcards were mailed out to 
landowners shortly thereafter.  Approximately two weeks later, a second mailing of the questionnaire was sent 
out to all first mailing non-respondents, and shortly after that they were sent a second thank you reminder 
postcard.  Finally, a third mailing of the questionnaire was sent out to all landowners who did not respond in the 
first two attempts. In all, six attempts were made to reach the landowners for a response. 
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enrolled in any of these programs. They were also asked whether they would be willing to 
participate in any government-sponsored restoration program and their attitudes toward 
various incentive instruments such as tax breaks, subsidies, and cost sharing were elicited. 
The second section of the survey was designed to collect information on the general 
characteristics of landholdings, such as property size, percentage of wetland, current land use, 
ownership type, when the property was first acquired, how it was managed, how much 
wetland had been lost, the percentage of household income generated from both surface and 
sub-surface activities, and the expected market value of the property. The third section of the 
survey asked questions regarding investment in wetland restoration and maintenance. In this 
section, landowners were asked whether they had conducted any wetland restoration and 
maintenance activities, the year in which they started these restoration projects, the type of 
restoration techniques they had used, the level of private investment expenditures they had 
made on wetland restoration and maintenance activities, and the level of public investment 
expenditures that had been made on wetland restoration and maintenance activities. In this 
section of the survey, the landowners were also asked about the factors that motivated or 
deterred them from conducting wetland restoration and maintenance activities, their 
perceptions about the source and level of uncertainty faced in wetland restoration and 
maintenance activities, and their general attitudes toward wetland restoration and 
maintenance. The fourth section included demographic questions, such as education, income, 
age, gender, and place of residence. The final section of the survey elicited the landowners‟ 
risk preferences. Three risk preference elicitation methods were used: self ranking, multi- item 
scale, and the direct expected utility method using hypothetical investment distributions with 
different levels of returns and risk.   
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Figure 5.1: An example of an aerial photography map of a wetland tract  in Louisiana’s 
coastal zone. In the survey questionnaire, the boundary of the tract was clearly marked 
and geospatial information about the location of the tract was also provided to help 
respondents identify the wetland tract.  
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 Of the original 378 survey questionnaires that were mailed out, 48 were not deliverable 
and 75 were returned completed. Removing the undelivered questionnaires from the sample, 
the survey response rate was approximately 23%.  The respondents owned a total of 393,680 
acres, or approximately 57% of the total acreage owned by all 378 landowners in the sample 
frame.  In term of the total wetland acreage controlled by the survey respondents, we found 
that survey respondents controlled approximately 6% of the total wetland acreage in 
Louisiana‟s coastal zone (3.4 million acres).  If one takes out the total wetland acreage owned 
by the top 50 corporations and the lands owned by the state such national refuges and wildlife 
management areas 5 in the sample frame, we found that the survey respondents controlled 
about 11% of the total wetland acreage in the coastal zone of Louisiana based on a very 
conservative assumption about the wetland percentage on these properties. Figure 5.2 presents 
the distribution of the survey respondents across the coastal zone of Louisiana. 
5.2  Risk Preference Elicitation Methods 
Three risk preference elicitation instruments were employed to measure the risk 
preferences of landowners: a self ranking question on risk preference, a multi- item scale 
approach, and the expected utility framework through hypothetical investments distributions 
with different levels of risk and expected net returns.  
5.2.1  The Self Ranking Risk Method   
Landowners were asked to rank their personal preferences for taking investment risks 
using a 10-point scale, with 1 being risk-hating and 10 being risk- loving. Previous studies 
                                                                 
5
  The top 50 landowners in our sample frame controlled approximately 2.7 million acres of land, but  it is 
unknown how much wetlands they controlled. Our survey data showed that, on average, landowners reported 
that 76% of their propert ies are wet lands( see table 5.3). We used a more conservative estimate to estimate the 
total wetland acreage controlled by the top 50 corporat ions. We used 50% rate as a base. Hence, it is estimated 
that the top 50 corporations controlled about 1.35 million acres of wetlands. The wild life management areas in 
the sample frame controlled about 554,215 acres  of land in coastal zone of Louisiana .  
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have employed the self ranking risk method (Cardona, 1999; Henderson, 2007; Thomas, 
1987; Schurle and Tierney, 1990; Faust and Gillespie, 2006) and compared the self ranking 
risk method to other risk elicitation methods, including interval and “closing- in” approaches 
(Thomas, 1987; Schuler and Tierney, 1990; Bard and Barry, 2001; Faust and Gillespie, 2006). 
The results of these studies  are mixed, with some finding a significant correlation between 
the  self-ranking risk preference elicitation method  and other methods (Schuler and Tierney, 
1990; Thomas, 1987; Fausti and Gillespie, 2006) and others find  no significant relationship 
between the self- ranking method and other methods (Bard and Barry, 2001).   
 
Figure 5.2: Distribution of the survey respondents across Louisiana’s Coastal zone. 
5.2.2  Multi-item Scale Approach  
In the psychological literature, the term “attitudes” refers to clusters of feelings, 
beliefs, and behavioral tendencies that are not directly observable (Baron and Byrne, 1981). 
Therefore, risk attitudes are latent variables that can be measured indirectly through a set of 
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indicator variables that are correlated with these latent variables. To measure risk attitudes 
using a multi- item scale approach, individuals are given a set of questions or items and asked 
to indicate the degree to which they agree or disagree with each question. This approach was 
found to perform well in terms of reliability and validity, and it is commonly used to measure 
the risk preferences of individuals (Penning and Garcia, 2001).  For this study, landowners 
were asked to indicate on scale from 1 (” I strongly disagree”) to 5 (“ I strongly agree”) the 
extent to which they agreed with a set of statements (Table 5.1) that were selected to „tap‟ the 
domain of the construct as recommended by Churchill (1995). Example applications of the 
scale approach can be found in the economic literature. Goodwin and Schroeder (1994) 
measured the risk attitudes of farmers using a binary variable of whether the farmers had 
preferences for business risk. Penning and Garcia (2001) measured the risk preferences of hog 
farmers using the multi-scale approach, where the farmers were give seven statements and 
asked to indicate the degree to which they agreed with each statement.  The study found that 
the risk attitudes measured using the multi- item scale approach were statistically related to 
risk attitudes measured using the expected utility framework.  
5.2.3  Investment Method   
The investment method of risk elicitation used in this study closely followed the 
experimental design developed by Gunjal and Legault (1996) and used the certainty 
equivalence concept associated with the expected utility model.  Table 5.2 presents the basic 
structure of the experiment.  The landowners were given seven investment distributions with 
various levels of net returns and risks. Each investment distribution had three outcomes (low, 
average, and high) with equal probability of any of the outcomes occurring.  The landowners 
were asked to select one of the investment distributions as being the most preferred, where the 
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distributions were calculated using the Constant Partial Risk Aversion (CPRA) utility function 
of the form:                where    is the certainty equivalent of the risky prospect 
and   is the coefficient of risk aversion. The outcomes of the investment distributions were 
calculated such that two adjacent investment distributions had the same expected utility value. 
In addition, the investment distributions were generated under the implicit assumption that the 
majority of landowners are risk averse. Landowners who selected investment options 1 to 4 in 
Table 5.2 were classified as risk averse.  Landowners who selected investment option 5 in 
Table 5.2 were classified as risk neutral, while landowners who selected investment options 6 
and 7 were classified as risk-takers. The upper and the lower limits of the coefficients of the 
constant partial risk aversion for each distribution are reported in Table 5.2. To investigate the 
changes in partial risk aversion for each landowner, we increased the level of investment by 
factors of 4 and 10.  
Table 5.1: Statements used to elicit the landowners’ risk preference  
 
1.  I like taking financial risks 
 
2.  I try to avoid investment risks  
 
3.  I am willing to take financial risks in order to realize higher returns  
 
4.  I prefer to receive a guaranteed return even if it is low 
 
5.  It is unlikely that I would invest in a business if it has a chance of 
failing 
6. When making investment decisions I attach equal weight to 
maximizing long-term returns and minimizing financial risks.  
 
7.  I aim to achieve high long-term returns on my investments even if 
that means taking significant financial risks in the short-run 
 
8.  I prefer to receive a guaranteed low return on my investments 
rather than an uncertain high return 
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Table 5.2: An example of the basic structure of the investment method experiment using 
a $25,000 investment level 
Investment 
option 
Lowest 
net 
return 
Average 
net return 
Highest 
net return 
Partial risk aversion 
interval 
 
1 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 +infinity to  7.47  
2 $2,271 $2,600 $2,930 7.47 to 2  
3 $1,989 $2,700 $3,412 2  to 0.85  
4 $1,603 $2,800 $3,997 0.85 to 0.32  
5 $962 $2,900 $4,838 0.32 to -0.32 
6 $372 $2,800 $5,228 -0.32 to -0.45 
7 $0 $2,700 $5,400 0.45 to -infinity 
 
5.3  Descriptive Summary of Survey Results 
5.3.1  Demographics  
Table 5.3 presents a summary of the demographic variables collected from the 
respondents. The vast majority of the respondents were male (93.15%) and Louisiana 
residents (92%). The average age for the respondents was just under 62 years, with a range of 
22 to 90 years old. The vast majority of the respondents were college graduates (57.53%), 
with 15.07% of the respondents having some college education and the remaining 27.4% of 
the respondents having no college education.  
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Table 5.3: Demographic characteristics of the respondents 
Variable  Percent (%) Cumulative percent (%) 
 
Education attainment 
  Some high school (or less) 4.11 4.11 
Completed high school or GED 15.07 19.18 
Trade or technical school graduate 8.22 27.4 
Some college 15.07 42.47 
College graduate 57.53 100 
 
Gender 
  Female 6.85 6.85 
Male 93.15 100 
 
Household total income 
  Under $15,000 1.67 1.67 
$15,001 to $30,000 8.33 10 
$30,001 to $50,000 6.67 16.67 
$50,001 to $70,000 6.67 23.33 
$70,001 to $100,000 11.67 35 
$100,001 to $150,000 23.33 58.33 
$150,001 to $200,000 16.67 75 
Over $200,000 25 100 
  
Residency 
   No Louisiana residence 8.22 8.22 
Louisiana residence 91.78 100 
 
Home location 
  Does not live on the property 90.41 90.41 
Lives on the property 9.59 100 
 
The income question was the most frequently skipped demographic question, with 
only 60 out of the 75 respondents providing information about income level. As reported in 
Table 5.3, 35% of the respondents had incomes of $100,000 or less, and 23% of the 
respondents had incomes in the range of $100,001 to $150,000. In additions, 17% of 
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respondents had incomes in the range of $150,001 to $200,000, and 25% of the respondents 
reported annual incomes over $200,000, The majority of the landowners (90.41%) reported 
that they did not live on the properties that were identified in the questionnaire.  
5.3.2  Attitudes Toward Wetland Conservation and Various Incentive Programs  
Landowners were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with 
various statements relating to wetland restoration. First, the landowners were asked, a general 
question about the importance of wetland restoration to future generations. The majority of 
the respondents (91%) either strongly agreed or agreed with this statement. Then the 
landowners were asked more direct questions about the values of wetland restoration. In 
response to the statement, “Restored wetlands protect wildlife and/or fish habitat,” 93% of the 
respondents strongly agreed or agreed with this statement. Similarly, about 92% of the 
respondents strongly agreed or agreed with the statement, “Restoring wetlands improves 
water quality and reduces erosion.” Approximately 90% of the respondents strongly agreed or 
agreed with the statement, “Wetland restoration provides storm and flood protection” (see 
figure 5.3).  
Asked about their awareness of various wetland restoration programs in the coastal 
zone, 46% of the landowners indicated that they were aware of wetland restoration programs 
in their area. Out of the group of respondents who were aware of wetland restoration 
programs in their areas, 47% had enrolled in one or more of the available programs.  
Landowners were also asked if they would be willing to participate in future programs, with 
the majority of the respondents (86%) indicating that they were willing to participate.  
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Figure 5.3: Respondents’ attitudes concerning the importance of restoring wetlands in 
coastal Louisiana  
Following this question, the landowners who were interested in participation were asked to 
indicate the importance of the following wetland restoration incentive instruments: 1) tax 
incentive, 2) cost-sharing assistance, 3) direct grants and subsidies, 4) temporary conservation 
easement, 5) permanent conservation easement, 6) wetland mitigation banking, and 7) carbon 
credit program. They were asked to rate (on a 5-point Likert scale) the importance of each of 
the incentive instruments (see Figure 5.4). The most preferred instrument was direct grants 
and subsidies (83% of the respondents rated this option as either somewhat important or very 
important). The second preferred instrument was cost sharing assistance, with 66% of the 
respondents rating cost sharing as either somewhat important or very important. Tax 
incentives were also popular, with about 59 % of the respondents indicating that this program 
was either somewhat important or very important. Somewhat less popular were permanent 
conservation easements and wetland mitigation banking, but a majority of the respondents 
(52% and 51 %, respectively) rated these two instruments either somewhat important or very 
important.  Temporary easement and carbon credit instruments received considerably less 
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support, with 35-36 % of the landowners indicating that these programs were somewhat to 
very important.   
 
Figure 5.4:  Landowners’ preferences for various incentive instruments for wetland 
restoration and maintenance in coastal Louisiana 
 
5.3.3  Characteristics of the Properties 
Landowners were asked a group of questions regarding the general characteristics of 
their landholdings, including property size, percentage of wetland, current land use, 
ownership type, the time that the property was first acquired, how is it managed, and how 
much wetland had been loss, the percentage of household income generated from both surface 
and sub-surface activities, and the expected market value of the property.  A statistical 
summary of the main variables in this section is presented in tables 5.4 and 5.5. The results 
show that the properties of the landowners who responded to the survey have diverse 
characteristics. The total acres owned by respondents ranged from 19 to 150,000 acres, with 
an average of 5,249 acres and standard deviation of 17,892 acres. The average wetland 
acreage on these properties was 2,764 acres, with a range of 16 to 25,175 acres. In percentage 
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terms, wetlands averaged about 76% of the property acreage of the respondents, ranging from 
5% to 100%.  
Table 5.4: Statistical summary of the property characteristics for respondents to the 
landowner survey. 
Variable  Mean Std Dev Min Max Total 
Property size 5,249 17,892 19 150,000 393,680 
Wetland percent 75.73 28.18 5 100 
 Wetland total acres 2,764 4,789 16.4 25,175 193,450 
Leased(0,1) dummy 
variable 0.43 0.50 0 1 
 Acres lost 329 1,176 0 800,7 17,417 
Leased acres 1,653 4,047 0 25,000 82,635 
 
Table 5.5:  Ownership structure and land management 
Variable  
Percent 
(%) 
Cumulative 
percent (%) 
Ownership type 
  Sole ownership 32 32
Joint ownership through a tenants- in- common 
arrangement  20 52 
Joint ownership through a corporation or trust 29.33 81.33 
Other ownership 18.67 100 
Management type 
  Self-managed 60.81 60.81 
Managed using hired a service or employees 12.16 72.97 
Managed by leaseholder 8.11 81.08 
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The most common ownership structure among respondents was sole ownership (about 
32 % of the properties). The second most common ownership structure was joint ownership 
through a corporation or trust, with 29% of the respondents choosing this category.  The third 
most common ownership category was joint-ownership through a tenants- in common 
arrangement, with about 20% of the wetland properties owned in this way. The remaining 
19% of the property were owned through some other, generally unspecified structure.  
A majority of the respondents (60.81%) indicated that they self-managed their 
landholdings (see Table 5.5). The distribution of other management types included the 
following: 19% of the respondents had their properties  managed by government personnel, 
12% of the properties were managed by a hired service or employees, and 8% of the 
properties were not being actively managed.  
Landowners were also asked in this section of the questionnaire about wetland loss on 
their properties and whether they were renting out part of their properties to other landowners. 
Although only 53 landowners (out of 75 respondents) provided estimates for wetland loss on 
their properties, these losses averaged 329 acres (standard deviation of 1176 acres), or   
approximately 14% of the total wetland acres held by the respondents to this question. When 
the landowners were asked if they leased out part of their properties, only 43% of the 
respondents indicated that they did, with the average lease size being 1,653 acres (standard 
deviation of 4,047 acres for the 50 respondents to this question).  
Landowners were asked to rate (on a 5-point scale) the importance of each of the 
following land activities on the tract of land specified in their questionnaire: 1) agriculture 
production, 2) timber production, 3) fur-trapping, alligator hunting and egg production, 4) 
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waterfowl hunting, 5) fishing, and 6) oil and gas activities. The primary land use was 
waterfowl hunting, with 57% of the respondents rating this land use option as either important 
or very important. The second land use option was oil and gas activities, with about 53% of 
the respondents rating this option as either important or very important. Fur-trapping, alligator 
hunting and egg production was also a popular land use option, with 40% of the respondents 
rating it as either somewhat important or very important. About 39% of the respondents rated 
the fishing land use option as either important or very important. Agricultural activities and 
timber production were not common in these coastal zone properties, with only 19% and 9% 
of the respondents rating these options as either somewhat important or very important, 
respectively. Finally, only 9% of the respondents indicated that they used their landholdings 
for other types of activities. Figure 5.5 presents a frequency chart of the land use activities.  
 
Figure 5.5: Values assigned by the landowners to various land uses activities associated 
with the current use of the property tract 
Landowners were asked about the percentages of their annual incomes derived from 
surface and subsurface activities on the specific tract of land noted in the questionnaire. The 
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vast majorities of the respondents derived no income from surface (70%) or subsurface 
activities (72%). For those respondents with income from surface and sub-surface activities, 
the surface income averaged about 12% of their annual income, ranging from less than 1%  to 
100%. Similarly, subsurface income averaged about 17% of their annual income, ranging 
from less than 1% to 88%.   
5.3.4. Wetland Investments 
Landowners were asked if they made any investment in wetland restoration and 
maintenance on the property specified in the questionnaire, and how much they privately 
invested over the last 10 years.  Only 35% indicated that they had, with the average total 
private expenditure over the 10 years period being $31,522 with an associated standard 
deviation of $93,265 (Table 5.6). Following this question, the landowners who had 
implemented wetland restoration projects were asked about the type of restoration practices 
they used. As reported in Table 5.7, the most commonly used practice was the installation of 
water control structures, with approximately 62% of the respondents using this me thod .. The 
second most commonly used practice was vegetative plantings (54% of the respondents), 
followed closely by sediment, dredge or spoil usage (about 50% of the respondents).  Finally, 
between 20% and 27% of the respondents reported using fresh water inputs, nutrient/sediment 
traps, or some other wetland restoration practices.  
The landowners who invested in wetland restoration projects were asked, using a 5-
point Likert scale, to indicate the importance of a set of factors related to their decisions to 
invest in wetland restoration and maintenance. The most important factor to the respondents 
was the desire to protect or enhance the ecological functions of their property (Figure 5.6).  
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Approximately 96% of the respondents rated this factor as either important or very important 
in their investment decision to. The desire to protect or enhance the property market value 
was listed as an important or very important reason for investing by 82% of the respondents. 
Table 5.6.  Statistical summary of the continuous variables in the investment section 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Investment level $31,521.74 $93,265.21 0 $600,000 
Invest(0.1) 
dummy 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Uncertainty 5.10 3.68 0 10 
Risk attitude 4.90 2.46 1 10 
 
Table 5.7.  Type of wetland restoration practices that the respondents used 
Name of restoration practice 
Restoration 
practice is 
used 
Restoration 
practice is 
not used  
Water control structures (gates, weirs, etc.)    61.54% 38.46% 
Vegetative plantings (trees or grasses) 53.85% 46.15% 
Nutrient/sediment traps (brush fences, terraces, etc.) 20% 80% 
Sediment, dredge or spoil usage                                          50% 50% 
Increased fresh water inputs to the property 26.92% 73.08% 
Others 24% 76% 
 
The availability of restoration subsidies and the desire to protect or enhance the property‟s 
revenue generation ability were listed as important factors by approximately 71% and 75% of 
the respondents, respectively. 
71 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6:  Respondents’ perceptions about various factors that influence their 
decisions to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance 
 Similarly, landowners were asked about the factors that have prevented them, or might 
prevent them in the future, from investing in wetland restoration (Figure 5.7). Potential 
respondents were given a list of factors and asked to indicate the importance to each factor 
using a 5-point Likert scale. Topping the list of these deterrent factors was the high cost of 
wetland restoration, with 75% of the respondents listing this factor as either important or very 
important in their decisions not to invest. The second most important factor was insufficient 
government financial incentives, with about 69% of the respondents rat ing this factor as 
important or very important. Uncertainty about future benefits and costs of wetland 
restoration and the lack of personal financial resources were also important, with about 66% 
of the respondents ranking these factors as either important or very important. Fifty two 
percent of the respondents listed the lack of personal economic benefits from wetland 
restoration as an important or very important impediment to investing. At the bottom of the 
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list of investment impediments was the lack of need for wetland restoration, with only 22% of 
the respondents reporting this factor as an important deterrent to investment.  
 
Figure 5.7.  Respondents’ perceptions about various factors that influence their 
decisions not to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance 
 
 Given the reported importance of uncertainty about future cost and benefits in the 
investment decision-making process, the landowners were also asked to identify the sources 
of uncertainty they were facing. Potential respondents were given a selected set of uncertainty 
sources and were asked to rank them (Figure 5.8). Uncertainty about changing government 
policies was ranked the number one source of uncertainty, with 50% of the respondents 
indicating it to be  the most important source of uncertainty and 19% of them ranking it 
second most important source. Another important source of uncertainty, as perceived by the 
landowners, was shifting environmental conditions, with 58% of the respondents ranking this 
as either the first or second most important source of uncertainty. Uncertainty about 
restoration costs and restoration technologies were ranked third and fourth, respectively.  
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Figure 5.8.  Respondents’ perceptions about uncertainty sources 
Finally, landowners were asked to assess the level of uncertainty associated with 
making a positive return on investment in wetland restoration and maintenance projects using 
a 0 to 10 scale, with 0 representing no uncertainty and 10 high uncertainty. On average, the 
respondents assessed the level of uncertainty to be right in the middle of the range (Table 5.6), 
with the average score being 5.10 (standard deviation equal to 3.68).  
5.3.5  Landowner Risk Preferences  
In total, 72 landowners responded to the self-ranking risk question. The responses of 
the respondents ranged from 1 to 10, with a mean of 4.9 ( Table 5.6). The self ranking risk 
question did not allow for classifying respondents into risk averse and risk taker groups 
because it did not provide a unique measure of the risk preferences of the respondents (such 
as the coefficients of the partial risk aversion in the investment method). However, the 
distribution of the respondents scores reported in Figure 5.9 was used to shed light on how 
landowners assessed their risk preferences compared to other landowners. For example, 
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Figure 5.9 shows that 43% of the respondents reported that they avoided taking investment 
risk compared to a respondent with a score of 5 (the median score). In addition, 38% of the 
respondents reported that they were willing to take more investment risk than a respondent 
with a score of 5. 
 
Figure 5.9. Landowners’risk attitude scores based on the self ranking question 
Principal component analysis6 of the multi- item scale approach revealed three important 
factors that explained about 72% of the total variation in the sample (Table 5.8). The first 
factor had an eigenvalue of 14.66 and explained about 34.11% of the total variation in the 
sample, and the second factor had an eigenvalue of 10.31 and explained 24% of the total 
sample variation. The third factor had an eigenvalue of 5.97 and explained about 14% of the 
total variation in the sample. Three items (4, 5, and 8) out of the total 8 items reported in 
Table 5.1 make up the first factor. Since two of these items are related to the return risk, then 
the first factor appeared to measure the landowners‟ attitudes toward risk in returns.  The  
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Table 5.8. Variance matrix of the principal component analysis 
Factor 
Eigenvalue 
(variance) 
Variance  
explained (%) 
Cumulative 
variance 
explained(%) 
Factor 1 14.66 34.11% 34.11% 
Factor 2 10.31 23.99% 58.10% 
Factor 3 5.97 13.89% 71.99% 
Factor 4 5.25 12.21% 84.21% 
Factor 5 3.51 8.18% 92.38% 
Factor 6 1.88 4.37% 96.76% 
Factor 7 1.39 3.24% 100% 
 
second factor was represented by two items (1 and 3), and both of them are related to 
financial risk. Hence, the second factor appeared to be measuring the landowners‟ attitudes 
toward the financial risk. Finally, item 2  had significant loadings on the eigenvector of the 
third factor. The third factor appeared to measure the importance of investment risk (see table 
5.9).   
 The multi- item risk method did not allow for classifying landowners into risk averse, 
risk neutral, or risk taker groups. However, principal component analysis can be used to 
calculate the scores of landowners associated with each factor, with these factor scores 
subsequently used to assess a respondents level of risk preference. Before running the 
analysis, all items presented in Table 5.9 were rescaled to take on values of -4 (”I strongly 
disagree”) to 4 (”I strongly agree”), with items with negative scores indicating that 
landowners avoided taking risk and items with positive scores indicating that landowners 
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were willing to take  risk. Consequently, respondents with positive factor scores would 
indicate that they were less willing to take risk than respondents with zero factor scores and 
respondents with negative factor scores would indicate that they were willing to take more 
risk than respondents with zero factor scores.  As reported in Table 5.10, results of the first 
factor model showed that 43% of respondents indicated they tend to take less risk than 
respondents with zero factor scores. However, about 40% of the respondents indicated that 
they were willing to take more risk than respondents with zero factor scores. Results of the 
other factor models are presented in Table 5.10.  
Table 5.9. Factor loading matrix of the principal component analysis  
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
I like taking financial risks 0.285 0.597 0.077 
I try to avoid investment risks  0.326 -0.369 0.777 
I am willing to take financial risks in order to 
realize higher returns 0.212 0.598 0.038 
I prefer to receive a guaranteed return even if it is 
low 0.535 -0.155 -0.047 
It is unlikely that I would invest in a business if it 
has a chance of failing 0.482 -0.185 -0.459 
I aim to achieve high long-term returns on my 
investments even if that means taking significant 
financial risks in the short-run 0.232 0.264 0.331 
I prefer to receive a guaranteed low return on my 
investments rather than an uncertain high return 0.442 -0.148 -0.257 
Note: factors‟ loadings that are larger than 0.4 are presented in bold. Only the results of the 
first three factors are reported in this table. 
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Finally, the distribution of the respondents‟ answers for the investment method 
question associated with a $25,000 investment level7 is reported in Table 5.11. In total, only 
52 landowners answered this question. The results showed that the vast majority of the 
respondents (73%) were classified as risk averse. About 21 % of the landowners were 
classified as risk neutral, and only 6% of the landowners were classified as risk takers.  
Table 5.10.  Landowners’ risk attitudes based on the multi-item scale approach 
Factor Avoid taking risk  Risk indifferent Like taking risk  
Factor 1 43.28% 16.42% 40.30% 
Factor 2 38.81% 23.88% 37.31% 
Factor 3 37.31% 29.85% 32.84% 
 
Table 5.11.  Landowners’ investment distribution choices associated with a  $25,000 
investment level  
 
Investment option Percent (%) Cumulative percent (%) 
1 17.31% 17.31% 
2 9.62% 26.92% 
3 17.31% 44.23% 
4 28.85% 73.08% 
5 21.15% 94.23% 
6 3.85% 98.08% 
7 1.92% 100% 
                                                                 
7
 Due to large number of missing observations associated with the question regarding the other two investment 
levels ($100,000 and $250,000), the results of the risk investment question for a $25,000 investment level  is 
discussed. 
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Taken together, the survey data collected in this study indicated that the majority of 
landowners were risk averse. About 73% of the respondents were classified as risk averse 
based on the investment method. The other risk preference elicitation methods did not allow 
for specific categorizations of the landowners into risk averse and risk taker groups, but they 
showed that a large number of respondents appeared to avoid taking risk in their investment 
decisions. A large proportion of landowners placed importance on wetland conservation, with 
more than 90% of the landowners either strongly agreeing or agreeing with statements related 
to the  importance of wetlands for  1) future generations, 2) wildlife and/or fish habitats, 3) 
water quality and erosion control, and 4) storm and flood  protections.  The survey results also 
provided important information regarding attitudes toward incentive programs for wetland 
restoration and maintenance. The majority of landowners (86%) indicated that they would be 
willing to participate in wetland restoration programs. About 83% of these landowners 
selected direct grants and subsidies as their most preferred incentive instrument.  Cost sharing 
assistance and tax incentives were the second and third most preferable incentive options, 
respectively. 
The primary land uses for respondents to the survey were waterfowl hunting and oil 
and gas activities. Timber and agricultural production were the least important land-use 
activities in the sample. The vast majority of landowners (70% or more) derived no income 
values from their wetland holdings.  With regard to investments in wetland restoration and 
maintenance projects, only 35% of the landowners had made any wetland restoration 
investments. Costs of wetland restoration, insufficient financial incentives, and uncertainty 
about future benefits and costs of wetland restoration projects were considered major 
deterrents to investment. With regard to the uncertainty sources, the majority of the 
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landowners listed uncertainty about changing government policies, and shifting 
environmental conditions as their chief concerns.  The next chapter uses this information, and 
more, to estimate the empirical models outlined in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 6  
RESULTS OF EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION 
Two econometric models to analyze landowner investment decisions were presented 
in chapter 4 – the Tobit model and the double hurdle model. The Tobit model assumes that 
landowners make the decisions to invest and the level of investment simultaneously, while the 
double hurdle model assumes that landowners make these decisions sequentially. To explore 
the implications of choosing each of these decision making models, this chapter presents 
empirical results from the estimation of the Tobit and the double hurdle models, comparing 
the results and testing to see which model best represents the survey data.  The material is 
presented in the chapter as follows.  First, a brief summary of the key variables used in the 
analysis is presented, followed by the results of the Tobit model estimation. Next, the results 
of the double hurdle model estimation are presented and discussed.  Lastly, the two 
econometric models are compared for their suitability given the collected data.  
6.1 Data Summary 
Descriptive statistics of the variables selected for the analysis are reported in Table 
6.1. Considering the dependent variables, “invest” is a discrete dummy variable that indicates 
if the landowners made any wetland investment on their property and “invest level” describes 
the level of private investments that were made over the last 10 years. The descriptive 
statistics show that majority of landowners did not invest in wetland restoration and 
maintenance with only 35% of the respondents indicating that they had done so. But, for those 
who did make private investments, the average total investment over the last 10 years was 
$31,522 (standard deviation of $93,265).   
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Table 6.1: Summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis  
Variable  Description Mean Std. Dev 
Invest =1 if investing in wetland restoration, 0 otherwise 0.35 0.48 
Invest 
level Total investment expenditure on wetland restoration($) 31,522 93,265 
Wetac Total wetland acres owned or managed 2,764 4,789 
Age Landowner's age, in  years 61.94 12.4 
Educ Landowner's  level of education  4.07 1.28 
Landinc  Total household income related to the property use ($) 8,922 26,828 
Sowner =1 of the landowner is a sole-owner, 0 otherwise 0.32 0.47 
Govwetrp 
=1 if the landowner is enrolled in  government wetland 
restoration programs, 0 otherwise 0.22 0.41 
Pubinv =1 if public investment is made on the property, 0 otherwise 0.12 0.33 
Consatt 
An index for the landowners  attitudes toward wetland 
conservation  4.69 0.7 
Riskatt  A self reported measure of risk attitude 4.9 2.46 
Agruse 
=1 if part of the property is used for agricultural production, 
0 otherwise 0.19 0.39 
LAresid =1 if the landowner is Louisiana residence, 0 otherwise 0.92 0.28 
Distshore Distance from the shore line(miles) 28.6 17.11 
Long Longitude(miles) 144.87 88.98 
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6.1.1  Characteristics of Landholdings  
A relevant explanatory variable in the decision to invest in wetland restoration and 
maintenance is the property size, represented here by the total wetland acreages owned or 
operated. Property size was previously found to have a positive effect on investment in soil 
conservation (Norris and Batie, 1987; Soule et al., 2000). It was expected that the larger the 
wetland size, the larger the level of investment in wetland restoration projects.  This variable 
was transformed via natural logarithm to allow for a nonlinear relationship between wetland 
investments and wetland property size.  
Land income (“landinc”) was defined as the total household income level8 derived 
from the activities that took place on the respondent‟s wetland property. This variable was 
created by multiplying the percentage of income derived from the both surface and sub-
surface activities with the mid-value of the income range that the respondents reported. A 
positive relationship between income and the decision to invest was reported in other studies 
(Norris and Batie, 1987; Romm et al., 1987; Zhang and Flick, 2001). It was expected that 
landowners with higher incomes from their wetland properties would invest more in wetland 
restoration and maintenance projects.  
Two property location variables were included in the analysis. The first location 
variable was the distance of the property (in miles) from the shoreline (Distshore). The 
distance of the property from the shoreline was  calculated by overlaying the digitalized 
property information with the existing GIS map of coastal   Louisiana. The distance of the 
                                                                 
8
  Out of the total sample (N=75), 60 respondents reported their income earn ings. An auxiliary regression was 
used to impute the missing data. Income was specified as a function of wetland acres (in natural logarithm) and 
education. The regression R-square was 0.41 and all explanatory variab les were h ighly significant. The predicted 
incomes from this auxiliary regression were used for the missing observations. The result of this auxiliary 
regression is presented in Appendix B. Due to missing observations of the explanatory variables in the auxiliary 
regression model, only 11 out of total 15 income missing observations were generated.  
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property from the shoreline was calculated by drawing a straight line between the property 
center and  the  nearest point on the coastal map, and measuring its length. This variable was 
included in the model as a proxy for the vulnerability of the wetland property to erosion and 
other exogenous, weather related forces. It also captured the impact of wetland type on the 
landowners‟ investment decision. Properties that are located close to the shoreline are 
generally dominated by salt marshes, and properties located further from the shoreline are 
dominated by fresh marshes. It was expected that landowners with wetland properties further 
inland are more likely to invest, and invest more, in wetland restoration projects. The second 
location variable was the longitude of the property (Long). This variable was included as a 
proxy for wetland losses. Historical wetland loss rates and projected losses are concentrated in 
the eastern part of the State, and then mainly in the lower Terrebonne, Barataria basins and 
Mississippi basins (Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (LADNR), 1999). As such, 
the high rate of wetland loss in the eastern part of the state may make investment infeasible 
and increases investment risk.  Therefore, landowners with properties located in the eastern 
part of the state would be less likely to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance projects. 
Alternatively, one might argue that the higher the rate of wetland loss in the eastern part of the 
state may encourage landowners to invest in wetland restoration projects in order to prevent 
additional wetland losses. Thus, the expected sign of this variable is ambiguous. The Long 
variable was measured in miles and it increases as the property location moves from wes t to 
east.  
The use of the property for agricultural production was also hypothesized to influence 
the decision to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance.  To capture this effect, a 
dummy variable for agriculture land use (Agruse) was included in the analysis.  Agruse was 
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assigned a value of 1 if a landowner used part of his/her landholding for agriculture 
production and 0 otherwise. It was hypothesized that landowners who use part of their 
properties for agricultural activities were less likely to invest in, wetland restoration projects 
than other landowners due to diminishing surface and subsurface wetland incomes, time 
constraints, and changes in operational focus.  
6.1.2  Characteristics of the Landowners  
Characteristics of the landowners included both demographic variables and attitudes 
toward risk and wetland conservation issues. The demographic variables included age, 
education, and residence, and ownership structure. Age was expected to be negatively 
associated with the dependent variables. Education was expected to have positive impact on 
the dependent variables. It was hypothesized that landowners who are sole owners and reside 
in Louisiana have higher chances to invest and invest more in wetland restoration projects.  
An index for the landowners‟ attitudes toward wetland restoration (Consatt) was 
constructed by averaging the responses of the landowners to four statements regarding the 
importance of wetland conservation for: 1) future generation, 2) wildlife and fish hab itats, 3) 
water quality and erosion control, and 4) storm and flood protection.  All responses were 
elicited using a Likert scale (1= strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3= neutral, 4=agree, and 
5=strongly agree).  It was hypothesized that the higher the score of the Consatt variable, the 
higher the likelihood and the level of wetland investments. A landowner‟s attitudes toward 
risk were elicited using the self-ranking risk question. They were given a 1 to 10 scale (1 
being risk hating, and 10 being risk loving) and asked to rate their risk preferences. Risk 
attitude was expected to have a negative relationship with the decision to invest in wetland 
restoration and maintenance projects.  
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6.1.3  Influence of Government Programs  
Participation in government wetland restoration programs (Govwetrp) is expected to 
influence a landowner‟s decision to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance projects. 
The Govwetrp variable is measured as a dichotomous variable, indicating whether a 
landowner is a participant in any wetland restoration programs. It was hypothesized that 
landowners who were enrolled in government-sponsored wetland restoration programs would 
be more likely to invest, and invest more, in wetland restoration and maintenance projects. 
Hence, the expected sign of the Govwetrp variable is positive. 
 The decision to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance projects was also 
expected to be influenced by the level of public investment (Pubinv) made on the property. 
Pubinv is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a landowner received cost sharing assistance or 
direct subsidies to conduct wetland restoration projects, and 0 otherwise. The expected sign of 
this variable is an empirical question.  
6.2  Results of the Tobit Model  
 
All parameter estimates and marginal effects of the Tobit model were generated using Stata 
version 11 (StataCorp, 2009).  The parameter estimates for the Tobit model and their 
associate standard errors are reported in Table 6.2. The standard errors associated with the 
parameter estimates of the Tobit model were made robust to some kinds of error 
misspecification, including  non-normality and hetroskedasticity,9 using the subroutine “Vce 
(robust)” in Stata (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).  The marginal effects for the variables that 
are used in the model, and their associated standard errors, are presented in Table 6.3.  Two 
                                                                 
9
 Tests for both non-normality and heteroskedasticity were conducted using the regression version of the 
Lagrange Multip lier (L test outlined in Wooldridge (2002) page 534. The result of the LM test failed to reject the 
null hypothesis of homoskedasticity (LM test of 0.427 with a p-value equal to  0.808). However, the LM test 
rejected the null hypothesis that the error terms are normally distributed. The value of the LM statistic is 43.803, 
and it has a p-value that less than 0.001. 
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types of marginal effects are reported . The conditional average marginal effects are the 
partial effects averaged across the sample observations and obtained using the “margeff” 
command in Stata.  The conditional marginal effects at the means are the partial effects 
estimated at the sample means of explanatory variables and obtained using the “mfx” 
command in Stata (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).  The two marginal effects can have 
significantly different values in nonlinear models. In addition, the average marginal effects 
are preferable for nonlinear models and models and in the case of discrete variables 
(Wooldridge, 2002, Papke and Wooldridge, 2008). Unless otherwise stated, therefore, the 
conditional marginal effects we refer to in the discussion section are the conditional average 
marginal effects.  Overall, the Tobit model fit the data well, with an overall model likelihood 
ratio statistic of 30.77 (significant at 1% level).  
The results in Table 6.2 reveal that property size is an important factor explaining a 
landowner‟s investment decisions. The coefficient of the variable representing wetland 
property size (Lnwetac) is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, indicating that 
the larger the wetland property size, the higher the probability of investment and level of 
investment in wetland restoration and maintenance. The conditional marginal effect 10 reported 
in Table 6.2 suggests that a 1% increase in wetland property size will increase private 
investment by approximately $299 for those landowners who had already decided to invest. 
This result is consistent with the finding of other studies. Norris and Batie (1987) found a 
positive relationship between farm size and the soil conservation expenditures, while Soule et 
al. (2000) found farm size to be positively related to the adoption of conservation practices.  
                                                                 
10
 The unconditional marginal effect s and the probability marginal effects were excluded from Table 6.3 for 
simplicity reasons and the absence of statistically significant marginal effects .   
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Dhakal et al. (2008) found that property size was positively related to the probability of 
investing in a forestry plantation.  
Table 6.2. Parameter estimates of the Tobit model 
Variable  Coefficient Robust standard error 
 
Constant 
 
-2214273* 
 
1097693 
Lnwetac 29918.81** 14152.73 
Riskatt 11767.48 13237.41 
Sowner 154632*** 55871.96 
Govwetrp 160479.8 116596.9 
Pubinv -91670.31 111136.6 
Landinc -0.93 2.04 
Agruse -211311.2* 119070.9 
Long -894.36* 471.51 
Distshore 6444.99* 3377.71 
Consatt 383296.2* 216603.3 
Age 431.1981 2868.953 
Educ 6474.37 20378.67 
LAresid -163196.9 114810.9 
 
Log-Likelihood -222.05  
Likelihood ratio statistics 30.77  
Prob>chi-square 0.0036  
Sample size 58  
***,**,* denotes that the corresponding parameters are significant at 1%,5% and 10% 
respectively 
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Table 6.3. Marginal effects for the Tobit model 
Variable  
Conditional marginal 
effect 
Conditional marginal effect 
 (evaluated at the mean level) 
Lnwetac 29919** 3903** 
 
(14153) (1952) 
Riskatt 11767 1535 
 
(13237) (1762) 
Sowner 154632*** 22994** 
 
(55872) (8928) 
Govwetrp 160480 26680 
 
(116597) (21084) 
Pubinv -91670 -10483 
 
(111137) (10839) 
Landinc -0.93 -0.12 
 
(2.04) (0.27) 
Agruse -211311* -22067** 
 
(119071) (10486) 
Long -894.36* -116.67** 
 
(471.51) (51.47) 
Distshore 6444.99* 840.76** 
 
(3377.71) (371) 
Consatt 383296* 50001** 
 
(216603) (13483) 
Age 431.20 56.25 
 
(2868.95) (371.64) 
Educ 6474 845 
 
(20379) (2792) 
LAresid -163197 -29321 
 
(114811) (22927) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses ***,**,* denotes that the corresponding parameters 
are significant at 1%,5% and 10% respectively,  
 
Other Tobit results indicate that ownership structure plays an important role in the 
investment decision. The coefficient of ownership dummy variable (Sowner) is positive and 
highly significant at the 1% level. As expected, landowners who were sole-owners were more 
likely to invest, and invest more, in wetland restoration and maintenance projects. Conditional 
on investing in wetland restoration and maintenance, landowners with a sole ownership 
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structure invested $154,632 more than other landowners. Ownership structure was previously 
found to be an important factor influencing the decisions to invest in soil conservation (Soule 
et al. (2000); Featherstone and Goodwin (1993); Norris and Batie (1987)), invest in forest 
improvement (Dhakal et al. (2008)), and participate in government forestry assistance 
programs (Nagubadi et al. 1996 ).  
 
The estimated coefficient for Agruse dummy variable was negative and significant at 
the 10% level, suggesting that landowners who use part of their properties for agricultural 
production are less likely to invest, and make smaller investments if they do, in wetland 
restoration projects. This negative correlation between agricultura l land use and the decision 
to invest was expected for several reasons. First, the survey data showed that the majority of 
landowners (more than 70%) derived no income values from their wetland properties. Hence, 
the presence of wetlands on agricultural production properties might impose extra costs on the 
landowners with farming activities because landowners cannot use these wetland areas for 
agricultural production purposes. Gelso et al.(2008) investigated the costs associated with the 
presence of wetland areas in cropland for Kansas producers. They found that the presence of 
wetlands imposed inconvenience costs on producers, especially the more dispersed these 
wetlands.  Second, one can argue that investment in wetland restoration is not very appealing 
for landowners engaged in agricultural activities for reasons such as time constraints, 
competition for private capital between agriculture and wetlands operations, and changes in 
operational focus.  Royer (1987) investigated the reforestation behavior of southern private 
landowners and found a negative relationship between farming and reforestation investments. 
The conditional marginal effect shows that landowners who had invested in wetland 
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restoration projects and used their properties for agricultural production invested $211,311 
less on wetland restoration and maintenance than other landowners.   
 The coefficient of the longitude variable (Long) was negative and statistically significant at 
10% level in the Tobit model. Thus, landowners with wetland properties in the eastern part of 
the state were less likely to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance than landowners in 
the western part of the state. This negative and significant correlation between the longitude 
of the property and the decision to invest was not unexpected. First, the majority of wetland 
losses in coastal Louisiana are concentrated in the eastern part of the State.  Second, the vast 
majorities of these wetlands are relatively unproductive (from an ecological perspective) salt 
marshes, at least compared to the coastal freshwater marshes in the western part of the state. 
This combination of high wetlands losses and relatively low productivity makes investments 
in properties located in the eastern part of the state less attractive to private landowners. The 
conditional marginal effect of the Long variable shows that investment in wetland restoration 
and maintenance decreased by $894  as the property location moved 1 mile west to east.   
The distance of the property from the shore line (Distshore) had positive and 
significant coefficient at the 10% level, indicating that   the probability of investment and the 
level of investment increases in relation to distance from the coast. This positive relationship 
between Distshore variable and investment was expected for several reasons. First, it is 
generally true that the further a tract is from the coastal boundary between land and open sea, 
the less vulnerable it is to the damaging effects of hurricane wind, storm water surges, and 
other weather related factors. This, in return, lowers the risk associated with the decision to 
invest in restoration projects and may increase the likelihood of investing in such projects. 
Second, freshwater marshes tend to dominate the wetland properties that are furthest from the 
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coastal boundary, and the expected return on an investment in freshwater wetlands is 
generally higher than for salt marshes. As reported in Table 6.3, the conditional marginal 
effect shows that the level of investment increased by $6,445 as the distance of the property 
from the shore line increased by 1 mile (evaluated at the mean distance of  28.6 miles,  the 
conditional marginal effect  was equal to $841 ).   
Attitudes toward wetland restoration and maintenance were found to be important 
factors in the investment decision. The coefficient of the variable that captured the 
landowner‟s attitudes toward wetland conservation (Consatt) was positive and statistically 
significant at the 10% level, indicating that landowners who sympathize with wetland 
conservation objectives were more likely to invest, and invest more, in coastal wetland 
restoration projects. Conditional on investing, an additional unit increase in the conservation 
attitude index (Consatt) increased the level of investment by approximately $383,296.  
Langpap (2004) found conservation attitudes to be an important factor in private landowners‟ 
decisions to participate in incentives programs for habitat protection of endangered species. 
However, Ervin and Ervin (1982) did not find statistical evidence that conservation attitudes 
influenced the decision to invest in soil conservation.  
Unexpectedly, the coefficient of the risk attitude variable (Riskatt) was not statistically 
significant given that. survey results indicated that landowners considered uncertainty an 
important impediment factor in their investment decisions. About 66 % of the respondents 
rated uncertainty about future benefits and costs of wetland restoration as either an important 
or very important impediment factor. The insignificant effect of risk aversion may be 
attributed to the failure of the Tobit model to treat the decision about whether to invest and the 
decision about how much to invest separately. The role of risk aversion in the two decision 
92 
 
processes is still an empirical question in the literature. Saha et al. (1994) demonstrated that 
that risk aversion played an important role only in the level of adoption decision but not the 
decision to adopt.  However, Koundouri et al. (2006) showed that risk aversion played an 
important role in the decision to adopt irrigation technology. In addition, another surprising 
result of the Tobit model was that none of the typical explanatory variables were statistically 
significant in the decision process, including age, land income (Landinc), education (educ), 
residency (LAresid), participation in government wetland restoration program (Govwetrp), 
and public investment(Pubinv)   
6.3  Results of the Double Hurdle Model 
The double hurdle model was estimated using Stata version 11 (StataCorp, 2009). 
Given that in most cases theory does not give clear guidance concerning allocation of 
explanatory variables between the first and second hurdles, an ad hoc method for selecting 
variables for each hurdle is used (Carroll et al, 2005). Specifically, the allocation of 
explanatory variables in the two hurdle equations was explored through a lengthy selection 
procedure that involved an iterative series of estimations. First, a preliminary probit model 
was estimated using all potential explanatory variables. Then, a preliminary Tobit model was 
estimated using all potential explanatory variables. Only explanatory variables that were 
statistically significant at the 10% level (or greater) in either a probit model or a Tobit model 
were selected to start the estimation of the double hurdle model. Initially, all of these 
significant variables were included in both the first and second hurdle equations, but 
statistically insignificant variables were gradually removed from the model.  In some ways, 
this procedure sought to mimic reverse stepwise regression, both to focus on the variables that 
had the most explanatory power and to conserve degrees of freedom in the estimations.  
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The maximum likelihood parameter estimates for the double hurdle model and the 
marginal effects for the variables were obtained using the Craggit command in Stata 
(described in Burke (2009). The parameter estimates and the associated standard errors are 
reported in Table 6.4, with marginal effects for the variables that are used in the model and 
their associated standard errors presented in Table 6.5. The marginal effects referred to here 
are the partial effects averaged across the sample observation. The standard errors for the 
marginal effects were calculated using the delta method and the nlcom command in Stata. The 
standard errors associated with the parameter estimates of the double hurdle model were made 
robust to some kinds of error misspecification, including non-normality and 
heteroskedasticity,11 using the command Vce (robust) in Stata(Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). 
 
As in the Tobit model, the estimated coefficient of the Longitude variable (Long) is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. Thus, wetland restoration  
and maintenance investments by private landowners were more likely to occur as one moves 
in a westerly direction. In other words, landowners facing high wetland losses (east) are less 
likely to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance, perhaps due to the risk of investment 
failure and the higher cost of restoration activities in areas where wetland loss is rapidly 
occurring. The probability marginal effect of the Long variable is statistically significant at 
1%. It shows that the probability of investment in wetland restoration and maintenance will 
decrease by 0.2% as the property location moves west to east by  1 mile. The unconditional 
marginal effect of Long variable, which is positive and significant at the 1% level, indicates 
                                                                 
11
 Similarly to the Tobit model case, we test for both non-normality and heteroskedasticity of the error term in 
the second hurdle equation us ing the regression version of the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test (Wooldridge, 
2002). The result of the LM test failed to reject the null hypothesis that the error terms are homoskedastic (value 
of the LM test is 1.09 with a p-value equal to  0.58). However, the LM test rejected the null hypothesis that the 
error terms are normally d istributed (value of the LM statistic is 19.1 with a p -value less than 0.001). 
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that expected investment in wetland restoration and maintenance decreases by $271 as the 
property location moves 1 miles to the east.  
Table 6.4. Parameter estimates of the double hurdle model 
Variable  Coefficient Robust 
standard error 
First hurdle equation 
Constant -13.744** 5.712 
Sowner 1.113** 0.535 
Agruse -1.990** 0.844 
Govwetrp 1.457*** 0.556 
Consatt 2.656** 1.146 
Long -0.008*** 0.003 
Distshore 0.029* 0.016 
Second hurdle equation 
Constant -1358299*** 273779 
Lnwetac 81295*** 16212 
Riskatt 69165*** 16048 
Sowner 400376*** 99277 
Govwetrp 298995*** 56834 
Pubinv -510153*** 73807 
Landinc 27.920*** 9.901 
Educ 46987 32953 
Sigma        59335*** 14248 
Log- likelihood -205.4  
Sample size 59  
***,**,* denotes that the corresponding parameters are significant at 1%,5% and 10% 
respectively 
 
 Similarly, the estimated coefficient of the variable Distshore is positive and 
statistically significant at 10% level in the first hurdle equation, indicating that the greater the 
distance of the property from the shoreline, the higher the probability of investment in 
wetland restoration and maintenance projects. As discussed earlier, the further a tract is from 
the coastal boundary, the less vulnerable it is to the damaging effects of hurricane wind, storm 
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water surges, and other weather related factors. This, in turn, lowers the risk associated with 
the decision to invest and may increase the likelihood of investing in such projects. 
Furthermore, tracts that are located close to the shore line are generally dominated by salt 
marshes and they are less productive than tracts located further from the shore, which are 
dominated by fresh marshes, perhaps making them less attractive as investment candidates. 
The marginal effect of this variable is positive and significant at the 1% level. It shows that 
the probability of investment increases by 0.6% as the property‟s distance from the shore 
increases by 1 mile.  The unconditional marginal effect shows that investment in wetland 
restoration and maintenance will increase by $1,067 as the property distance from the shore 
increases by 1 mile.  
Past studies have found ownership structure to be a significant influence on the 
decision to invest in soil conservation (Soule et al., 2000); Featherstone and Goodwin, 1993; 
Norris and Batie, 1987), forestry improvements ( Dhakal et al.,2008), and decisions to 
participate in government forestry assistance programs (Nagubadi et al., 1996 ). In this study, 
the impact of the ownership structure was captured using a dummy variable (Sowner) that 
was equal one if the landowner was a sole-owner and 0 otherwise.  The estimated coefficient 
of this variable was positive and significant at the 5% level in the first hurdle, implying that 
landowners who are sole-owners are more likely to invest in wetland restoration and 
maintenance than other landowners. The marginal effect of this variable indicates that sole-
owners are 23% more likely to invest privately in wetland restoration and maintenance. In 
addition, the coefficient of Sowner is positive and significant at the 1% level in the second 
hurdle equation, implying that landowners who are sole-owners are not only more likely to 
invest, but they also invest more than owners with other types of ownership structures. The 
96 
 
unconditional marginal effect indicates that sole-owners privately invest $103,405 more in 
wetland restoration and maintenance activities than other landowners.  Conditional on the 
investment decision, sole-owners are found to invest $155,356 more in wetland restoration 
and maintenance than other landowners.  
Table 6.5. Marginal Effects for the Double Hurdle Model 
 
Variable 
 
Probability 
Conditional 
Investment 
Unconditional 
Investment 
Lnwetac  25094*** 9454*** 
  (5708.48) (345.21)  
Riskatt  21350*** 8043*** 
  (5651.14) (341.74)  
Sowner 0.228 155356 103405 
 n/a n/a n/a 
Agruse -0.290  -63139 
 n/a  n/a 
Govwetrp 0.332 125968 136470 
 n/a n/a n/a 
Consatt 0.545***  96528*** 
 (0.1374)   (7172)  
Long -0.0015***  -271.28*** 
 (0.00034)  (18.24) 
Distshore 0.006***  1067.4*** 
 (0.00194)  (84.4) 
Pubinv  -121865 -61375 
  n/a n/a 
Landinc  8.620** 3.25*** 
  (3.359) (0.203) 
Educ  14504 5464*** 
  (10998.5) (665.11)  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses  
***,**,* denotes that the corresponding parameters are significant at 1%,5% and 10% 
respectively, 
 
The estimated coefficient for landowner attitudes toward wetland restoration and 
maintenance (Consatt) was positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in the first 
hurdle equation, indicating that landowners who value wetland restoration issues are more 
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likely to invest in coastal wetland restoration. The marginal impact of this variable suggests 
that a 1 unit increase in the conservation attitude index increases the probability of investment 
by 55% and increases the expected level of investment by approximately $96,528.  Langpap 
(2004) found conservation attitudes to be an important factor in private landowner decisions 
to participate in incentives programs. Gelso et al. (2008) also found that farmer attitudes 
toward conservation and environmental regulation have a significant impact on the perceived 
costs associated with the presence of wetland areas on their farmlands. However, Ervin and 
Ervin (1982) found no statistical evidence that conservation attitudes influence the decision to 
invest in soil conservation. 
 The double hurdle estimation shows that landowners who are using part of their 
properties for agricultural activities are less likely to invest in wetland restoration projects, 
with the coefficient of the dummy variable (Agruse) being negative and significant at the 5% 
level in the first hurdle equation. As discussed with respect to the Tobit model, this negative 
relationship between the use of a land tract for agricultural production and the probability of 
wetland investment is not surprising. Several factors can explain this negative correlation, 
including the lack of farming income from wetland areas, competition for private capital 
between agriculture production and wetland restoration, and the costs involved in changing 
operational focus. The results of this study are similar to the findings of Royer (1987), where 
engagement in farming activities was negatively related to reforestation investment. The 
marginal effect value of this variable implies that landowners who are using their properties 
for agricultural production have, on average, a 29% smaller chances of investing in wetland 
restoration and maintenance than other landowners, ceteris paribus.  The unconditional 
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marginal effect shows that landowners who use part of their landholdings for agriculture 
production invest $63,139 less on wetland restoration and maintenance than other landowners.  
 In contrast to the Tobit model results, participation in government-sponsored wetland 
restoration programs (Govwetrp) had a positive effect on the probability of investment and the 
level of investment in the double hurdle model, with the estimated coefficient of Govwetrp 
being positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in both hurdles.  This result supports 
the hypothesis that government wetland restoration programs have stimulated at least some 
private wetland investment in coastal Louisiana. The marginal effect indicates that 
landowners enrolled in wetland restoration programs have a 33% higher probability of 
investing in wetland restoration and maintenance. The unconditional marginal effect shows 
that landowners who were enrolled in wetland restoration programs invested $136,470 more, 
on average, than other landowners.  Conditional on having made the decision to invest, 
landowners who are enrolled in wetland restoration programs invest $125,968 more than other 
landowners.  These results are similar to those found in other studies.  For example, Hagos 
and Holden (2006) studied the influence of public programs on the household‟s investment in 
soil conservation in northern Ethiopia, and found that participation in public programs 
stimulated investment in soil conservation. In another instance, Featherstone and Goodwin 
(1993) used a Tobit model and found that participation in government programs had a 
positive effect on farmer decisions to invest in soil conservation.  
 The estimated coefficient of the public investment dummy variable (Pubinv) was 
negative and highly significant in the second hurdle equation, indicating that receiving public 
financial assistance results in lower private investment, thus signaling a substitution 
relationship between public and private capital. The marginal effects show that landowners 
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who use public investments to conduct wetland restoration and maintenance activities invest 
$61,375 less than landowners who did not receive public investments. Conditional on 
investing, landowners who use public investment invest $121,865 less on wetland restoration 
and maintenance than other private landowners.  This result is similar to Zhang and Flick 
(2001), who found that forest landowners receiving cost sharing subsidies invested less of 
their own capital in forest replanting.  These authors also concluded that there was a 
substitution effect between public funds and private capital.  
Risk attitude was found to play an important role in the level of private investment 
made by the landowner. The coefficient of this variable (Riskatt) was positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, implying that the more risk averse the landowners, the lower the 
investments will be in wetland restoration and maintenance.  Both the conditional and 
unconditional marginal effects for the risk attitude variable were statistically significant at the 
5% level (see Table 6.5).  The unconditional marginal effect indicates that a 1 unit increase in 
the risk attitude score (in other words, becoming less risk averse) leads to an $8,043 increase 
in the level of private investment. The conditional marginal effect of this variable shows that a 
1 unit increase in the risk attitude score leads to $21,350 increase in the  level of investments 
for the landowners who have already made the investment decision. Figure 6.1 presents the 
predicted wetland investments for various levels of risk aversion, holding all other variables 
constant at their means. The predicted wetland investment ranges from $1,703 for a highly 
risk averse landowner to $46,573 for a highly risk taking landowner. Therefore, risk aversion 
decreases the expected level of wetland investment. This negative relationship between risk 
aversion and investment has been documented in other studies that examined similar decision 
making problems (Ervin and Ervin, 1982; Shapiro, 1992; Hagos and Holden, 2006; Benitez el 
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al., 2006; Goldstein et al., 2006; Stordal et al., 2007; Abadi Ghadim et al., 2005; Isik and 
Khanna, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Predicted wetland investments associated with various levels of risk attitudes. 
 
The coefficient of the wetland property size (lnwetac) was positive and statistically 
significant in determining the level of investment (the second hurdle equation), indicating that 
larger wetland properties generally experience higher levels of investment. Furthermore, the 
coefficient of the wetland property size variable in the Tobit model was approximately 64% 
lower than the estimated coefficient of wetland size in the double hurdle model. This 
divergence between the two models exemplifies the degree of bias that can arise when an 
intrinsically two-stage decision process is modeled as a single process.   The conditional 
marginal effect of wetland size suggests that a 1% increase in property size will lead to a $250 
increase in the level of investment in restoration and maintenance, while the conditional 
marginal effect for  the Tobit model shows that  a 1% increase in size increases the level of 
investment by  $299 (or approximately 20% more than the corresponding conditional 
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marginal effect reported for the double hurdle model). As a comparison, the literature reported 
mixed results regarding the relationship between investment and the property size. Some 
studies found that property size had significant positive effects on investment decisions 
(Norris and Batie, 1987; Soule et al., 2000); Dhakal et al., 2008). Other studies, however, 
found no significant relationship between property size and investment decisions (Ervin and 
Ervin, 1982; Featherstone and Goodwin, 1993; Romm et at., 1987; Hagos and Holden, 2006; 
Zhang and Flick,  2001). The result of double hurdle estimation in this study, however, clearly 
indicates that property size has positive effects on the investment decisions for private 
landowners.  
The coefficient of the land income variable (Landinc)  was positive and statistically 
significant in the second hurdle equation, indicating that landowner income plays an 
important role in determining the level of private investment in wetland restoration and 
maintenance, with more productive properties (in terms of income) receiving higher levels of 
private investment. This positive relationship between income and investment was reported in 
a number of other studies (Norris and Batie, 1987; Romm et al., 1987; Zhang and Flick, 
2001), but Featherstone and Goodwin (1993) did not find a relationship between total farm 
income and soil conservation investments. The marginal effects reported in Table 6.5 show 
that a $1 increase in income from wetland-based activities resulted in a $3.25 increase in the 
level of investment for all landowners, and a $8.62 increase for those landowners who had 
already made previous investments.   
Finally, the estimated coefficient of the education variable (educ) was positive but 
statistically insignificant. The unconditional marginal effect was significant and shows that a 
move from one education category to the next highest category would lead to a $5,464 
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increase in the level of investment. For example, a respondent who has completed college will 
invest $5,464 more in wetland restoration projects if he/ she has some college education (but 
never completed it). On the other hand, the conditional marginal effect was larger in 
magnitude, but not statistically significant. Previous studies have found education to be a 
significantly positive influence on the level of investment in technology adoption (Saha et al., 
1994) and soil conservation (Ervin and Ervin, 1982; Norris and Batie, 1987; Hagos and 
Holden, 2006). 
One way of interpreting the estimated double hurdle model is by categorizing 
landowners into two groups. The first group, landowners who do not cross the first hurdle 
equation, may never invest in wetland restoration and maintenance under any circumstances. 
The second group, landowners who pass the first hurdle, are potential investors. This second 
group has two choices: a) invest in wetland restoration and maintenance (positive value of the 
dependent variable) or b) do not invest in wetland restoration and maintenance (zero value of 
the dependent variable).  Therefore, the estimated double hurdle model can be used to predict 
the probability that an individual landowner would fall in one of the two categories. 
Consequently, looking at the common characteristics of the landowners in each category may 
be of interest when it comes to discussing the policy implications of landowner behavior. The 
probability that a landowner will not invest in wetland restoration and maintenance can be 
expressed as follows: 
                               
                                      (50) 
where     is a vector of the estimated parameters of the variables that are included in the first 
hurdle equation. Equation (50) was estimated for all the landowners who did not invest in 
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wetland restoration and maintenance at the time the survey was taken. The predictive results 
(see Figure 6.2) show that most landowners have a high probability of never investing in 
wetland restoration projects. More specifically, the histogram shows that 85% of the 
landowners who did not invest in wetland restoration projects at the time of the survey have 
probabilities in excess of 0.5 that they will never invest in wetland restoration projects. The 
results also show that, on average, the probability that a landowner in this group would never 
invest in wetland restoration and maintenance was 0.81.  
 
Figure 6.2: Histogram of predicted probability of no investment in wetland restoration 
and maintenance 
Similarly, we can use the double hurdle model to look at probability distributions for 
landowners who are potential investors. The probability that a landowner will invest in 
wetland restoration and maintenance is: 
                
                                               (50)  
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where    is the vector of the estimated parameters of the variables that are included in the first 
hurdle equation. Equation (50) was estimated for all landowners in the sample who reported 
investing in wetland restoration projects at the time of the survey, and a frequency histogram 
of the results is presented in Figure 6.3. The results indicate that only 46% of the landowners 
who are potential investors have probabilities of investment higher than 50%.  Put another 
way, the majority of the landowners in the group of potential investors have probabilities of 
investment lower than 50% based on the estimated double hurdle coefficients.  
 
Figure 6.3: Histogram of predicted probability of investment in wetland restoration and 
maintenance 
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6.4  Model Selection 
The results of the Tobit and double hurdle models presented in the previous sections 
show that both models adequately represented the collected data. However, comparisons of 
the two models suggest that the double hurdle model might better explain the data (compared 
to the Tobit model) due to a larger number of significant parameters. This hypothesis can be 
tested by: a) estimating a Tobit model with only the variables found in the second hurdle of 
the double hurdle model (the result of this restricted Tobit model is presented in Appendix C ) 
using a likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis that the univariate Tobit is superior to the 
double hurdle model. The resulting likelihood ratio statistic was 2(229.5-205.4)=48.2 with a 
chi-square distribution and 7 degrees of freedom. This result indicates that the Tobit model 
specification can be rejected in favor of the double hurdle model specification at the 5% level 
of significance, or that landowners make private wetland restoration and maintenance 
investment decisions in a sequential manner by first deciding whether to invest and then 
deciding how much to invest.  
While the Likelihood ratio (LR) test shows that the double hurdle model outperforms 
the Tobit model, the double hurdle model is preferable to the Tobit model for other reasons, 
too. For example, several variables, including risk attitude (Riskatt), are not statistically 
significant in the Tobit model, but they are significant in the double hurdle model.  In part, 
this leads to the double hurdle model‟s better explanatory power.  
Existing literature suggests that risk attitude plays an important role in investment 
decisions (Ervin and Ervin, 1982; Shapiro, 1992; Hagos and Holden, 2006; Benitez el al., 
2006; Goldstein et al., 2006; Stordal et al., 2007; Abadi Ghadim et al., 2005; Isik and 
Khanna, 2003; Saha et al., 1994; Koundouri et al., 2006).  The majority of these studies found 
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a negative relationship between risk aversion and the level of investment. Results of the 
double hurdle estimation are in line with these findings.  The result of the Tobit model, 
however, did not show that risk aversion significantly influenced the landowner‟s investment 
decision.  
Previous findings on the role of income on investment decisions are inconsistent. 
Some studies found income to be an important factor in the investment decision (Norris and 
Batie, 1987; Zhang and Flick, 2001; Romm et al., 1987), while others studies did not 
(Featherstone and Goodwin, 1993). The result of the double hurdle model suggests that 
income significantly influences the level of investment decision. This result is in line with the 
results of most previous studies, and lends support to the double hurdle model as the best fit to 
the data. On the other hand, the results of the Tobit model do not show that income affects 
investment decisions of the landowners.  
Participation in government programs has been found to influence the farmers‟ 
decisions to invest in soil conservation (Featherstone and Goodwin, 1993) and reforestation 
investment ( Zhang and Flick, 2001 ). Two variables were used to capture the participation 
decisions of the landowners in this study – Govwetrp and Pubinv.  The coefficients of these 
two variables are statistically significant in the double hurdle model, but not in the Tobit 
model. This is additional evidence that the double hurdle model outperforms that Tobit model, 
which in return emphasizes the importance of the first hurdle in the decision process.  
It was hypothesized that the more positive the attitudes toward wetland restoration 
issues, the more likely that landowners would invest in wetland restoration and maintenance. 
This hypothesis is supported by both the estimated double hurdle model and the Tobit model. 
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The coefficient of the Consatt variable is positive and significant at 1% and 10% levels of 
significance respectively. The result of the double hurdle model shows that landowners‟ 
attitudes toward wetland restoration influence only the landowners‟ decisions about whether 
to invest but not the level of investment. This is the reason for including this variable only in 
the first hurdle equation. Our findings are in line with the results of the study by Langpap 
(2004). 
In summary, the double hurdle model statistically outperformed the Tobit model, was a 
better explainer of the collected data, and conformed to the majority of findings in related 
research areas.  The next, and final, chapter uses the results from the double hurdle model  in 
support of a discussion examining the implications of the modeling for efforts to promote the 
use of private investment in coastal wetland restoration and maintenance.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Encouraging private wetland landowners to invest in wetland restoration and 
maintenance activities can be a challenging task.  First, any decision to invest in restoration 
and maintenance is  subject to a high level of uncertainty associated with climate change, 
changes in wetland regulatory policy, and changes in restoration technologies, Second, the 
majority of the benefits associated with wetland restoration and maintenance activities are 
enjoyed by the public rather than private landowners themselves, thereby presenting, at least 
partly, a public goods barrier to individual action. This dissertation developed a theoretical 
model of the landowner‟s decision making process in the face of uncertainty and relatively 
high wetland restoration costs. The conditions under which landowners would invest were 
derived under assumptions of risk aversion and relatively high fixed and variable costs. The 
validity of the theoretical model was tested using survey responses from 75 private wetland 
landowners in coastal Louisiana. Two econometric models (Tobit and double hurdle) were 
estimated to determine the importance of various factors, including risk aversion, on the 
probability and the level of private coastal wetland investments.  
The results of the survey data showed that the vast majority of landowners considered 
the costs of wetland restoration and the uncertainty surrounding future benefits and costs of 
wetland restoration projects as the major factors deterring wetland restoration in coastal 
Louisiana.  The survey respondents considered changing government policies and shifting 
environmental conditions as major sources of uncertainty. Overall, the majority of landowners 
were found to be risk averse, an observation that partly explains the respondent‟s focus on 
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uncertainty and highlights the fact that uncertainty and restoration costs play important roles 
in the decision to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance activities.  
The Likelihood Ratio (LR) test was employed to test the null hypothesis that the Tobit 
was superior to the double hurdle model. The result of the LR test indicates that the Tobit 
model specification can be rejected in favor of the double hurdle model specification, thus 
suggesting that landowners make their investment decisions in a sequential, two-step process.  
First, landowners decide whether to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance, and 
second, they decide on how much to invest.  The double hurdle model conformed closely to 
both the theoretical expectations and previous empirical research concerning the importance 
of various factors in the decision to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance. For 
example, several variables, including risk attitudes of the landowners and land income were 
not statistically significant in the Tobit model, but they were highly significant in the double 
hurdle model.   
The role of risk in landowner decisions was shown to arise from at least two sources: 
the varying risk attitudes among landowners and the physical risk factors associated with the 
location of the wetland property. More specifically, risk aversion decreased the expected level 
of restoration and maintenance, and the physical risk factors associated with the location of 
the wetland property, and high restoration costs, decreased the likelihood of investment. 
These relationships are evident in the geographic dispersion of investments, where 
landowners who own/manage properties that are located in the eastern part of the state and 
located close to the shore line (highly vulnerable areas) being less likely to invest in wetland 
restoration and maintenance projects than other landowners.   
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Wetland property size was also an important factor that helped determine whether a 
landowner would invest in wetland restoration and maintenance. Landowners with larger 
wetland properties invested more in wetland restoration and maintenance activities than other 
landowners. The results also indicated that landowners who used at least part of their 
properties for agriculture production were less likely to invest in restoration projects. A 
couple of reasons can be proposed for this finding, including the potential for lost farm 
incomes due to wetlands – either because of direct resource-use competition or competition 
for scarce fixed and variable cost capital – or the diversion of managerial focus from 
production to preservation. The results also show that landowners who are sole-owners are 
not only more likely to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance, but they also invest 
more in these projects. Landowner‟s attitudes toward wetland conservation had a positive 
influence on the decisions to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance, with positive 
attitudes toward wetland conservation increasing the probability of investment.  
Participation in government-sponsored wetland restoration programs was a very 
important determinant of a landowner‟s investment decisions. Landowners who participate in 
government-sponsored wetland restoration programs have higher probabilities of privately 
investing in wetland restoration and they make larger investments than other landowners. At 
the same time, private investment expenditures in wetland restoration projects are lower for 
landowners receiving public financial assistance, which suggests a substitution effect between 
public and private capital. 
Finally, the results of the double hurdle model showed that income is also important 
determinants of a landowner‟s decision to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance. 
Total household income derived from activities on the wetland property had a  positive 
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influence on the investment decision, with higher income households having higher levels of 
investment. Education also had a positive effect on the landowner‟s decision regarding the 
level of wetland investment but it was statistically insignificant at 10% level of significance,.  
The result of this modeling effort also highlighted the difference between the marginal 
effects obtained by averaging the partial effects across the sample (average marginal effects) 
and the marginal effects obtained at the sample means. In general, average marginal effects 
for the Tobit model were approximately 7 to 8 times more than the marginal effects computed 
at the sample mean. This result raises a serious question about which marginal effect should 
be used in an analysis. For example, if the average marginal effects across the sample are the 
correct ones, then using the marginal effects at the sample means can seriously underestimate 
the effects of the explanatory variables and lead to erroneous conclusions. The opposite is true 
if the marginal effects at the sample mean are the correct ones. While the literature contains 
only limited discussions of this topic, and is still inconclusive about which type of marginal 
effects should be used, several authors have advocated the use of average marginal effects for 
nonlinear models and models with discrete variables (Greene 2003,Wooldridge 2002, Papke 
and Wooldridge 2008, Bartus 2005). Therefore, only the average marginal effects for the 
double hurdle model were reported, and all the discussions of the model results were done in 
terms of the average marginal effects.  
Once estimated, the double hurdle model was used to predict the probability of zero 
future investments in wetland restoration and maintenance projects for all landowners in the 
sample who did not undertake any wetland restoration projects. The results indicate that 85% 
of the landowners who did not invest in wetland restoration projects at the time of the survey 
have probabilities in excess of 0.5 that they will never invest in wetland restoration projects. 
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This finding supports the anecdotal evidence that the vast majorities of landowners are not 
only not planning to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance, but that the idea of doing 
so does not even occur to them.  
The results presented in this dissertation have potentially important implications for 
the design of policy instruments to encourage private wetland restoration efforts in coastal 
Louisiana.  First, policies need to consider the effects of risk aversion, and uncertainty on a 
landowner‟s decisions to invest in wetland restoration projects. Failure to do so will not only 
lead to overestimating the participation rates in a program, but it will also lead to 
underestimating the size of the needed incentive payments for participation and the expected 
costs of the policy instruments. Therefore, incorporating the effects of risk aversion, and 
uncertainty into the benefit-cost analysis of the proposed policy may provide more realistic 
assessment of how a wetland restoration policy will perform in the future.  
Another result with strong policy implications concerns the current and future role of 
publically-funded restoration programs.  Landowners who participate in government-
sponsored wetland restoration programs are more likely to invest in wetland restoration and 
maintenance and make more private investments than landowners who have no experience 
with the government programs. This suggests that the existing programs in the coastal zone 
such as Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration Act (CWPPRA), and Coastal Wetland 
Reserve Program (CWRP) have been effective in introducing restoration technology to 
landowners and in encouraging them to take a more active role in the stewardship of their 
land.  Coupled with the result that a landowner‟s attitudes toward wetland conservation have a 
positive influence on the probability of investing, an argument can be made in favor of 
expanded education programs concerning the benefits of wetland conservation and restoration 
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activities. At the same time, however, there was a distinct public- for-private capital 
substitution effect when examining landowners who received some form of financial 
assistance in conducting restoration projects.  While this substitution effect is not surprising, it 
does imply that the size of, and rules governing, financial assistance programs needs to be 
closely considered so that they do not have the perverse effect of reducing overall private 
investment.  
The results of the modeling effort clearly showed a competitive relationship between 
agricultural production and wetland restoration.  While policies similar to the Wetland 
Reserve Program – which provides financial and technical support for  landowners to protect 
and restore  wetland areas on their properties – would be one way to reduce this competition, 
other avenues need to be explored to increase the revenue generating capability of wetlands, 
particularly those in agricultural areas.  In fact, because the total amount of household income 
derived from activities on the wetland property was found to have positive influence o n the 
level wetland investment, one could expect wetland owners to welcome that enhance the 
income generation capability of wetland properties. For example, under the North American 
Wetlands Conservation Act (NAWCA), landowners can receive financial support to 
undertake waterfowl habitat improvement projects. The survey data shows that waterfowl 
hunting was the primary land use among the survey respondents. Therefore, the expansion of 
programs such as NAWCA should provide additional incentives for private restoration 
activities in the coastal zone.  
Variations in wetland investments across the characteristics of the landowners and 
their landholdings have policy implications with regard to the design and implementation of 
wetland restoration programs that seek to encourage private actions. For example, results of 
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the double hurdle model suggests that any program will be more effective if it targets 
landowners who are more educated, own large wetland properties, are sole-ownership 
organized, are not engaged in agricultural production, and have properties that are located 
inland and in the western part of state.  Such a policy, if correctly structured and implemented, 
could lead to high participation rates and significant private investments. For example, we 
used the parameter estimates of the double hurdle model to estimate the total amount of 
private investment that has been expended by all landowners in the analysis. We find that the 
estimated total level of investment for all 59 landowners over the last ten years is 
approximately $2,629,991. On average, each landowner invests about $44,576 in wetland 
restoration and maintenance activities over the last ten years.  Extrapolating that level of 
investment to all landowners in the sample frame, the expected level of private investment in 
wetland restoration and maintenance is $7,481,258 for the ten year period.  
   In the absence of targeted wetland restoration programs, wetland investments might 
not occur in coastal areas where wetland restoration projects are thought to be needed the 
most (i.e., areas with high wetland loss rate). If the objective of the wetland policy is to 
maximize investments in high-risk areas, then publicly-funded projects may be a better 
approach. Alternatively, it may be possible to design a program, or separate programs, that 
would address the unique characteristics of the wetland restoration problems on the opposite 
sides of the state.   
Given the magnitude and scope of the problem in coastal Louisiana, the best strategies 
for addressing wetland loss should include cooperation between all interested parties, 
jncluding  private landowners, local communities and their citizens, and government officials. 
Private landowners control the vast majority of wetlands in the coastal zone, but they have 
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very limited private capital and their investment decisions have limited effects in the absence 
of existing large scale public restoration projects. Similarly, there are limited public funds to 
completely address the issue of wetland loss in Louisiana‟s coastal zone, and the majority of 
public restoration projects will either affect or be implemented on private properties. As a 
result, the cooperation of private landowners, and the coordination of their private investment 
decisions with public restoration projects, are necessary for any successful wetland restoration 
effort.  Wetland restoration programs can be more effective if they target the participation of 
private landowners in areas that are actively being addressed by public restoration projects. 
Furthermore, these wetland restoration programs will be most effective if they are designed to 
encourage greater coordination of investment decisions of adjacent landowners and 
landowners in close geographic areas.  
 .  
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APPENDIX-A  
WETLAND INVESTMENT SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Enclosed with this questionnaire are a number of maps, each one showing a property tract in the coastal 
zone.  Later in this questionnaire we are going to ask you to focus on just one of these tracts of land, but 
for the first few questions (1 through 5) we would like you to answer with res pect to all  of the properties 
you own or manage. 
 
 
1. How many total  acres of land (wetlands and uplands)  do you own (by yourself, 
jointly, or as a corporation) and into how many separate tracts is it divided? 
 
________ acres           div ided among           ________ tracts 
 
Wetlands can be defined as areas having wet soils supporting water -loving plants 
for at least part of the year and/or areas covered by shallow water at some time 
during the year. 
 
2. Given this defin ition, what percent of the total acreage from ques tion 1 is wetland?  
________ percent   (If zero, you do not have to finish the survey – please mail 
                                 back the questionnaire in the envelope provided). 
3. Do you know that various government-sponsored wetland restoration and 
maintenance programs exist?  
o No 
o Yes – If yes, how many acres do you currently have in each of the following 
programs?    
________  Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP)       
________  Coastal Wetlands Reserve Program (CWRP) 
________  Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA) 
________  Coastal Wetlands Planning, Preservation &  
Restoration Act (CWPPRA) 
________  Other (Please exp lain below) 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
4. Would you be willing to participate in future government-sponsored wetland 
restoration and maintenance programs? 
o No, not under any circumstances (If no, p lease skip  question 5). 
o Yes, given the right incentives and conditions.  
 
5. Please indicate (by circling a number) the level of importance each potential 
incentive would have in convincing you to participate in future government -
sponsored wetland restoration and maintenance programs. 
      Not                                        Very 
Important                             Important  
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General tax breaks  
 
 1---------2---------3---------4---------5 
Cost-sharing assistance 
 
 1---------2---------3---------4---------5 
Direct grants and subsidies 
 
 1---------2---------3---------4---------5 
Temporary conservation easements  
 
 1---------2---------3---------4---------5 
Permanent conservation easements 
 
 1---------2---------3---------4---------5 
Expanded opportunities to use 
wetlands in mitigation banking 
(development offset)  
 
1---------2---------3---------4---------5 
Use of wetlands in carbon credit 
programs 
 
1---------2---------3---------4---------5 
Other incentives (please explain)  
 
1---------2---------3---------4---------5 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
The next section of the questionnaire (questions 6 through 24) seeks information about one of the property 
tracts that you own. If you look at the property maps, you will notice that each is labeled with a letter at 
the top.  Please choose the property tract that you have invested the most in with respect to wetlands 
restoration/maintenance and answer the following questions with that s pecific property in mind.  If you 
have not invested in any of the property tracts, please choose the largest tract and ans wer the remaining 
questions.  
 
I am going to be ans wering the following questions with res pect to property   
o Tract A  
o Tract B   
 
 
6. Do you still maintain ownership (solely, jointly, or other) in the tract?  
o Yes – If yes, in what year did your ownership start?          _______ 
o No – If no, what year did you stop owning the property?  _______  
 
IF YOU NO LONGER HAVE OWNERS HIP,  
PLEAS E S KIP TO QUES TION 25. 
7. How do you own the specific property tract?  
o Sole ownership  
o Joint ownership through a tenants -in-common arrangement   
o Joint ownership through a corporation or trust  
o Other (p lease exp lain ) 
________________________________________________________ 
 
8. If you maintain jo int ownership of the property, what percent of the tract do 
you own? 
 
_________ percent 
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9. What percent of your total 2008 household income came from surface (non-oil 
& gas) activities taking place on the tract? 
 
_________ percent 
10. What percent of your total 2008 household income came from sub-surface (oil 
& gas) activities taking place on the tract? 
 
_________ percent 
11. How many wetland acres have been lost on this tract of land due to erosion, 
storms, or other environmental factors during the time you have owned it?  
________ acres 
12. How would you describe the overall condition of the wetlands within the tract?  
o Poor 
o Good  
o Excellent 
o I don‟t know 
 
 
 
13. Please indicate (by circling a number) the level of importance each of the 
listed activities has in the way the property tract is currently used.  
      Not                                       Very 
Important                           Important  
 
Agriculture production  
 
 
 1---------2---------3---------4---------5 
Timber production 
 
 1---------2---------3---------4---------5 
Fur trapping, alligator hunting, 
and/or egg collection 
 
 1---------2---------3---------4---------5 
Waterfowl hunting 
 
 1---------2---------3---------4---------5 
All types of fishing 
 
 1---------2---------3---------4---------5 
Oil & gas activities 
 
 1---------2---------3---------4---------5 
Other (p lease exp lain ) 
 
 1---------2---------3---------4---------5 
  
 
14. Is any part of this tract being leased out for activit ies in question 13?  
o No           Yes – If yes, how many acres are leased out?  _______ acres 
 
15. Which of the following best describes the current management of this property?  
o Self-managed 
o Managed using a hired service or employees  
o Managed by a leaseholder 
o Not being actively managed 
o Managed by government personnel 
 
16. If you were to sell the property tract today, what price do you think you might 
receive?  
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 $ ____________ 
17. Have any wetland maintenance or restoration activities ever been attempted on 
this tract of land? 
o No, not to my knowledge (please skip to question 22) 
o Yes – If yes, what year d id they start?                                     _______ year 
 
Please estimate the total number of wetland acres that have been  
restored or maintained on this tract of land over the last 10 years  _______acres  
                                                                   
 
18. What practices were used to restore or maintain the wetlands on this tract of 
land?   (Please check all that apply)  
o Water control structures (gates, weirs, etc.)                         
o Vegetative plantings (trees or grasses)                                 
o Nutrient/sediment traps (brush fences, terraces, etc.)         
o Sediment, dredge or spoil usage                                          
o Increased fresh water inputs to the property                        
o Other (p lease exp lain below)                                               
_______________________________________________________ 
 
 
19. If you were involved in the decision to undertake restoration and maintenance 
activities on this tract of land, please indicate (by circling a number) the level of 
importance each of the listed reason was to your decision. 
      Not                                       Very 
Important                           Important  
 
Availability of restoration 
subsidies in the form of 
monetary payments 
 
 
 1---------2---------3---------4---------5 
Availability of restoration 
subsidies in the form of 
technical assistance 
 
1---------2---------3---------4---------5 
Desire to protect or enhance the 
property market value  
 
1---------2---------3---------4---------5 
Desire to protect or enhance the 
property‟s revenue generating 
ability 
 
 1---------2---------3---------4---------5 
Recent improvements in 
restoration technology  
 1---------2---------3---------4---------5 
  
Desire to protect or enhance the 
ecological functions  
 1---------2---------3---------4---------5 
  
Other (p lease exp lain below) 
 
 
1---------2---------3---------4---------5 
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20. Over the last 10 years that you had ownership in the property, what level  of 
private investment expenditures were made on wetland restoration and 
maintenance activities?  Please do not include expenditures that were paid for 
by non-private parties, such as government agencies or programs. 
 
$  __________      
21. Over the last 10 years that you had ownership in the property, what level of 
public (i.e., governmental agency or program) investment expenditures were 
made on wetland restoration and maintenance activities (if you only know the 
government‟s cost share, please provide that information)?  
 
$  __________        or       _________   percent cost share 
o Public investments were made, but I do not know how much.  
 
22. If no restoration or maintenance activities have been attempted on the tract of 
land, or if you would not consider future restoration activities, please indicate 
(by circling a number) the level of importance each of the listed reason was to 
this decision. 
      Not                                       Very 
Important                           Important  
 
High current cost of  
restoration  
 
 
 1---------2---------3---------4---------5 
Uncertainty about future costs 
and benefits of restoration  
 1---------2---------3---------4---------5 
  
Insufficient government 
financial  incentives 
 
 1---------2---------3---------4---------5 
No need for wetland restoration 
 
1---------2---------3---------4---------5 
Lack of personal financial 
resources for restorations 
 
1---------2---------3---------4---------5 
Lacks of  personal economic 
benefits from  restorations 
1---------2---------3---------4---------5 
  
 
 
 
23. Uncertainty can sometimes be an important factor when making decisions.  With 
respect to your wetland investment decision, please rank the following sources of 
uncertainty in terms of their importance to you, with 1 being the most important, 2 
the next most important, etc.  
____    Changing government policies  
____    Availability of effect ive restoration technology 
____    Changing restoration costs 
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____    Shift ing environmental conditions 
____    Others (please specify______________________________________) 
 
24. If you consider uncertainty an important factor in your wetland investment decision, 
please indicate your level of uncertainty in whether your investment will yield a 
positive payoff by circling the appropriate number?  
 
0---------1--------2-------3-------4--------5--------6-------7--------8--------9-------10 
No uncertainty                                                                          High uncertainty 
 
This next question seeks information that will help us better understand your 
attitudes concerning coastal wetlands restoration.   
 
25. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree with each of the statements by 
circling the appropriate number using the given scale: 
 Strongly                                       Strongly 
Disagree                                          Agree  
Restoration  is important to 
future generations 
 
 
 1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
Restored wetlands protect 
wildlife and/or fish habitat 
 
 1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
Restoring wetlands 
improves water quality and 
reduces erosion 
 
1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
Restored wetlands provide 
storm and flood protection 
 
1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
Restoring wetlands is a 
waste of time and money 
given the predicted 
increases in sea level  
 
 1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
 
 
In this next section we ask questions that will allow us to categorize your res ponses with 
other survey participants.  
 
26. How o ld are you?   _______ 
27. What is the highest level of education that you have attained? 
o Some high school (or less) 
o Completed high school or GED 
o Trade or technical school graduate 
o Some college     
o College graduate 
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28. What is your gender? 
o Male 
o Female 
 
29. Which of the following best describes your total household pre-tax 2008 income?  
o Under $15,000 
o $15,001 to $30,000 
o $30,001 to $50,000 
o $50,001 to $70,000 
o $70,001 to $100,000    
o $100,001 to $150,000 
o $150,001 to $200,000 
o Over $200,000 
 
30. Are you a legal resident of the State of Louisiana?  
o Yes 
o No 
 
31. Do you live on the tract of land indicated on the map included in this survey 
package? 
o Yes 
o No 
 
 
 
This last section of the questionnaire is designed to help us measure your attitudes 
towards risk and how those attitudes might affect your decision making regarding 
wetlands conservation and restoration.   
 
32. Compared to other landowners, how would you rate your willingness to undertake 
risky investments? (please circle the appropriate number  
         1--------2--------3--------4--------5--------6--------7--------8--------9--------10 
       Risk Hating                                                                                  Risk Loving 
 
33. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree with each of the fo llowing 
statements by circulating the appropriate number.  
 Strongly                                Strongly 
Disagree                                  Agree 
 
I like taking financial risks 
 
 
 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
 
I try to avoid investment risks  
 
 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
 
I am willing to take financial risks in 
order to realize higher returns  
 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
 
 
I prefer to receive a guaranteed return 
even if it is low 
 
 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
 
 
It is unlikely that I would invest in a 
 
 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
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business if it has a chance of failing  
 
 
When making investment decisions I 
attach equal weight to maximizing 
long-term returns and minimizing 
financial risks. 
 
1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
 
I aim to achieve high long-term returns 
on my investments even if that means 
taking significant financial risks in the 
short-run 
1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
  
I prefer to receive a guaranteed low 
return on my investments rather than 
an uncertain high return 
1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
 
Another way to measure your attitudes towards risk is to ask you to choose from a group of potential 
investments where you know the possible outcomes of each choice. 
 
34.  Suppose that you are given $25,000 to invest, and you have seven investment options to choose from (see 
graph below). Each investment option will yield one of 3 levels of net returns, with a 1 in 3 chance of each 
level occurring. These investment options are designed such that the level of risk you face increases as you 
move from left to right on the graph.  
 
For example, by choosing investment #1 you are guaranteed to receive an annual net return of $2,500. 
However, if you choose investment #7 you have a 1 in 3 chance of doubling your retu rn compared to #1, but 
you also have a 1 in 3 chance of losing all the guaranteed return you would have received under investment 
#1. Please examine the likely annual net returns from the 7 potential investment options and circle the 
number of the option you would prefer to have.  
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35. Now assume that your investment level has been increased from $25,000 to $100,000.  Please examine the 
likely annual net returns from the 7 potential investment options and circle the number of the option you 
would prefer to have.  
 
 
36. Now assume your investment level has been increased from $25,000 to $250,000. Please examine the likely 
annual net returns from the 7 potential investment options and circle the number of the option you would 
prefer to have.  
 
 
37. Please use the space below to provide us with other comments or suggestions you might have concerning 
the incentives and programs that could be used to encourage private investment in coastal wet land 
restoration and maintenance    
Thank you for completing the survey.  
Please mail the questionnaire back in the envelope provided. 
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 APPENDIX-B 
RESULTS OF THE AUXILIARY REGRESSION MODEL 
 
 
Table B1. Prediction of the total household income 
Variable Coefficient Standard error 
Intercept 1.168 0.788 
Lnwetac 0.365*** 0.118 
Educ 0.570*** 0.179 
R-Square 0.41 
  
***, denotes that the corresponding parameters are significant at 1% 
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APPENDIX-C 
RESULTS OF THE RESTRICTED TOBIT MODEL 
 
 
 
Table C1. Parameter estimates of the restricted Tobit model 
 
Variable Coefficient 
Robust  
standard error 
Constant -582377** 237994.8 
lnwetacr 36147.34 22993.89 
Riskatt 23563.67 15714.18 
Sowner 120062* 64970.49 
Govwetrp 94710.88 143271.3 
Pubinv -8900.84 141251.1 
Landinc -1.66 1.12 
Educ 15403.04 23442.78 
Log-Likelihood 
-229.5 
 Likelihood ratio 
statistics 16.47 
 Prob>chi-square 
0.02 
 Sample size 
59 
 ***,**,* denotes that the corresponding parameters are significant at 1%,5% and 10% 
respectively 
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